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Abstract
We build a Kleene realizability semantics for the two-level Minimalist Foundation MF,
ideated by Maietti and Sambin in 2005 and completed by Maietti in 2009. Thanks to this
semantics we prove that both levels of MF are consistent with the (Extended) formal Church
Thesis CT.
Since MF consists of two levels, an intensional one, called mTT, and an extensional one,
called emTT, linked by an interpretation, it is enough to build a realizability semantics for the
intensional level mTT to get one for the extensional one emTT, too. Moreover, both levels
consists of type theories based on versions of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory.
Our realizability semantics formTT is a modification of the realizability semantics by Beeson
in 1985 for extensional first order Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with one universe. So it is formal-
ized in Feferman’s classical arithmetic theory of inductive definitions, called ÎD1. It is called
extensional Kleene realizability semantics since it validates extensional equality of type-theoretic
functions extFun, as in Beeson’s one.
The main modification we perform on Beeson’s semantics is to interpret propositions, which
are defined primitively in MF, in a proof-irrelevant way. As a consequence, we gain the validity
of CT. Recalling that extFun+ CT+ AC are inconsistent over arithmetics with finite types,
we conclude that our semantics does not validate the Axiom of Choice AC on generic types.
On the contrary, Beeson’s semantics does validate AC, being this a theorem of Martin-Lo¨f’s
theory, but it does not validate CT. The semantics we present here appears to be the best
Kleene realizability semantics for the extensional level emTT. Indeed Beeson’s semantics is not
an option for emTT since AC on generic sets added to it entails the excluded middle.
1 Introduction
A foundation for mathematics should be called constructive only if the mathematics arising from it
could be considered genuinely computable. One way to show this is to produce a realizability model
of the foundation where arbitrary sets are interpreted as data types and functions between them are
interpreted as programs. A key example is Kleene’s realizability model for first-order Intuitionist
Arithmetics validating the formal Church Thesis.
Here we will show how to build a realizability model for the Minimalist Foundation, for short
MF, ideated by Maietti and Sambin in [14] and then completed by Maietti in [10], where it is
explicit how to extract programs from its proofs. In particular we show that MF is consistent with
the (Extended) Church Thesis, for short CT. This result is part of a project to know to what extent
MF enjoys the same properties as Heyting arithmetics.
The Minimalist Foundation is intended to constitute a common core among the most relevant
constructive and classical foundations. One of its novelties is that it consists of two levels: an
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intensional level, calledmTT, which should make evident the constructive contents of mathematical
proofs in terms of programs, and an extensional level, called emTT, formulated in a language close
as much as possible to that of ordinary mathematics. Both intensional and extensional levels of
MF consist of type systems based on versions of Martin-Lof’s type theory with the addition of a
primitive notion of propositions: the intensional one is based on [18] and the extensional one on [17].
Actually mTT can be considered a predicative version of Coquand’s Calculus of Constructions [4].
To build a realizability model for the two-level Minimalist Foundation, it is enough to build it
for its intensional level mTT. Indeed an interpretation for the extensional level emTT can be then
obtained from an interpretation of mTT by composing this with the interpretation of emTT in a
suitable setoid model of mTT as in [10] and analyzed in [12]. Moreover, since the interpretation of
CT from the extensional level to the intensional one is equivalent to CT itself according to [10], a
model showing consistency of mTT with CT can be turned into a model showing consistency of
emTT with CT.
Here, we build a realizability model for mTT+ CT by suitably modifying Beeson’s realizability
semantics [2] for the extensional version of first order Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with one universe [17].
So, as Beeson’s semantics our model is based on Kleene realizability semantics of intuitionistic
arithmetics and it is formalized in Feferman’s classical arithmetic theory of inductive definitions,
called ÎD1 ([5]). The theory ÎD1 is formulated in the language of second-order arithmetics and it
consists of PA (Peano Arithmetic) plus the existence of some (not necessary the least) fix point for
positive parameter-free arithmetical operators.
We call our Kleene realizability semantics extensional since it validates extensional equality of
type-theoretic functions extFun, as Beeson’s one.
The main modification we perform to Beeson’s semantics is to interpret propositions, which
are defined primitively in MF, in a proof-irrelevant way. More in detail we interpret mTT-sets
as Beeson interpreted Martin-Lo¨f’s sets, propositions are interpreted as trivial quotients of Kleene
realizability interpretation of intuitionistic connectives, and the universe ofmTT-small propositions
is interpreted as a suitable quotient of some fix point including all the codes of small propositions
by using the technique Beeson adopted to interpret Martin-Lo¨f’s universe.
As a consequence in our model we gain the validity of CT but we loose the validity of the full
Axiom of Choice AC. Instead in Beeson’s semantics, AC is valid, being this a theorem of Martin-
Lo¨f’s theory, but CT is not. All these results follow from the well known fact that extFun+ CT+
AC over arithmetics with finite types are inconsistent. Therefore in the presence of extFun as in
our emTT, either one validates CT as we do here, or AC as in Beeson’s semantics. Recalling that
the addition of AC on generic sets in emTT entails the excluded middle, Beeson’s semantics is
not an option for emTT. Therefore the semantics we present here appears to be the best Kleene
realizability semantics for the extensional level emTT.
Actually a consistency proof for emTT with CT could also be obtained by interpreting this
theory in the internal theory of Hyland’s effective topos [8]. But here we have obtained a proof in
a predicative theory, whilst classical, as ÎD1. As a future work we intend to generalize the notion of
effective topos to that of a predicative effective topos in order to extract the categorical structure
behind our realizability interpretation.
2 The Minimalist Foundation
In [10] a two-level formal system, called Minimalist Foundation, for short MF, is completed
following the design advocated in [14]. The two levels of MF are both given by a type theory a`
la Martin-Lo¨f: the intensional level, called mTT, is an intensional type theory including aspects
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of Martin-Lo¨f’s one in [18] (and extending the set-theoretic version in [14] with collections), and
its extensional level, called emTT, is an extensional type theory including aspects of extensional
Martin-Lo¨f’s one in [17]. Then a quotient model of setoids a` la Bishop [3, 7, 1, 20] over the intensional
level is used in [10] to interpret the extensional level in the intensional one. A categorical study of
this quotient model has been carried on in [12, 11, 13] and related to the construction of Hyland’s
effective topos [8, 9].
MF was ideated in [14] to be constructive and minimalist, that is compatible with (or inter-
pretable in) most relevant constructive and classical foundations for mathematics in the literature.
According to these desiderata,MF has the following peculiar features (for a more extensive descrip-
tion see also [15]):
• MF has two types of entities: sets and collections. This is a consequence of the fact
that a minimalist foundation compatible with most of constructive theories in the literature,
among which, for example, Martin-Lo¨f’s one in [18], should be certainly predicative and based
on intuitionistic predicate logic, including at least the axioms of Heyting arithmetic. For
instance it could be a many-sorted logic, such as Heyting arithmetic of finite types [21], where
sorts, that we call types, include the basic sets we need to represent our mathematical entities.
But in order to represent topology in an intuitionistic and predicative way, then MF needs
to be equipped with two kinds of entities: sets and collections. Indeed, the power of a non-
empty set, namely the discrete topology over a non-empty set, fails to be a set in a predicative
foundation, and it is only a collection.
• MF has two types of propositions. This is a consequence of the previous characteristic.
Indeed the presence of sets and collections, where the latter include the representation of power-
collections of subsets, yields to distinguish two types of propositions to remain predicative:
those closed under quantifications on sets, called small propositions in [10], from those closed
under any kind of quantification, called propositions in [10]. This distinction is crucial in the
definition of “subset of a set” we adopt in MF: a subset of a set A is indeed an equivalence
class of small propositional functions from A.
• MF has two types of functions. As in Coquand’s Calculus of Constructions [4], or Fe-
ferman’s predicative theories [5], in MF we distinguish the notion of functional relation from
that of type-theoretic function. In particular in MF only type-theoretic functions between two
sets form a set, while functional relations between two sets form generally a collection.
This restriction is crucial to make MF compatible with classical predicative theories as Fefer-
man’s predicative theories [5]. Indeed it is well-known that the addition of the principle of
excluded middle can turn a predicative theory where functional relations between sets form
a set, as Aczel’s CZF or Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory, into an impredicative one where power-
collections become sets.
2.1 The intensional level of the Minimalist Foundation
Here we describe the intensional level of the Minimalist Foundation in [10], which is represented by
a dependent type theory called mTT. This type theory is written in the style of Martin-Lo¨f’s type
theory [18] by means of the following four kinds of judgements:
A type [Γ] A = B type [Γ] a ∈ A [Γ] a = b ∈ A [Γ]
that is the type judgement (expressing that something is a specific type), the type equality judgement
(expressing when two types are equal), the term judgement (expressing that something is a term of
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a certain type) and the term equality judgement (expressing the definitional equality between terms
of the same type), respectively, all under a context Γ.
The word type is used as a meta-variable to indicate four kinds of entities: collections, sets,
propositions and small propositions, namely
type ∈ {col, set, prop, props }
Therefore, in mTT types are actually formed by using the following judgements:
A set [Γ] D col [Γ] φ prop [Γ] ψ props [Γ]
saying that A is a set, that D is a collection, that φ is a proposition and that ψ is a small proposition.
Here, contrary to [10] where capital latin letters are used as meta-variables for all types, we
use greek letters ψ, φ as meta-variables for propositions, we mostly use capital latin letters A,B as
meta-variables for sets and capital latin letters C,D as meta-variables for collections.
As in the intensional version of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory, inmTT there are two kinds of equality
concerning terms: one is the definitional equality of terms of the same type given by the judgement
a = b ∈ A [Γ]
which is decidable, and the other is the propositional equality written
Id(A, a, b) prop [Γ]
which is not necessarily decidable.
We now proceed by briefly describing the various kinds of types in mTT, starting from small
propositions and propositions and then passing to sets and finally collections.
Small propositions in mTT include all the logical constructors of intuitionistic predicate logic
with equality and quantifications restricted to sets:
φ props ≡ ⊥ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | (∀x ∈ A) φ(x) | (∃x ∈ A) φ(x) | Id(A, a, b)
provided that A is a set.
Then, propositions in mTT include all the logical constructors of intuitionistic predicate logic
with equality and quantifications on all kinds of types, i.e. sets and collections. Of course, small
propositions are also propositions.
φ prop ≡ φ props | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | (∀x ∈ D) φ(x) | (∃x ∈ D) φ(x) | Id(D, d, b)
In order to close sets under comprehension, for example to include the set of positive natural
numbers {x ∈ N | x ≥ 1}, and to define operations on such sets, we need to think of propositions
as types of their proofs: small propositions are seen as sets of their proofs while generic propositions
are seen as collections of their proofs. That is, we add to mTT the following rules
props-into-set)
φ props
φ set
prop-into-col)
φ prop
φ col
Before explaining the difference between the notion of set and collection we describe their construct-
ors in mTT.
Sets in mTT are characterized as inductively generated types and they include the following:
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A set ≡ φ props | N0 | N1 | N | List(A) | (Σx ∈ A)B(x) | A+B | (Πx ∈ A)B(x)
where the notation N0 stands for the empty set, N1 for the singleton set, N for the set of natural
numbers, List(A) for the set of Lists on the set A, (Σx ∈ A)B(x) for the indexed sum of the family
of sets B(x) set [x ∈ A] indexed on the set A, A+ B for the disjoint sum of the set A with the set
B, (Πx ∈ A)B(x) for the product type of the family of sets B(x) set [x ∈ A] indexed on the set A.
It is worth noting that the set N of the natural numbers is not present in a primitive way in
mTT since its rules can be derived by putting N ≡ List(N1). Here we add it to the syntax of
mTT because it plays a prominent role in realizability and we want to interpret it directly in ÎD1
to avoid complications due to list encodings.
Finally, collections in mTT include the following types:
D col ≡ A set | φ prop | props | A→ props | (Σx ∈ D)E(x)
and all sets are collections thanks to the following rule:
set-into-col)
A set
A col
where props stands for the collection of (codes for) small propositions and A→ props for the collection
of propositional functions of the set A, while (Σx ∈ D)E(x) stands for the indexed sum of the family
of collections E(x) col [x ∈ D] indexed on the collection D.
Note that the collection of small propositions props is defined here with codes a` la Tarski as in
[18], contrary to the version in [10], to make the interpretation easier to understand. Its rules are
the following.
Elements of the collection of small propositions are generated as follows:
Pr1) ⊥̂ ∈ props Pr2)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
p∨̂q ∈ props
Pr3)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
p→̂q ∈ props
Pr4)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
p∧̂q ∈ props
Pr5)
A set a ∈ A b ∈ A
Îd(A,a, b) ∈ props
Pr6)
p(x) props [x ∈ B] B set
̂(∃x ∈ B)p(x) ∈ props
Pr7)
p(x) ∈ props [x ∈ B] B set
̂(∀x ∈ B)p(x) ∈ props
Elements of the collection of small propositions can be decoded as small propositions via an
operator as follows
τ -Pr)
p ∈ props
τ (p) props
and this operator satisfies the following definitional equalities:
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eq-Pr1) τ (⊥̂) = ⊥ props eq-Pr2)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
τ (p∨̂q) = τ (p)∨ τ (q)props
eq-Pr3)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
τ (p→̂q) = τ (p)→ τ (q) props
eq-Pr4)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
τ (p∧̂q) = τ (p)∧ τ (q)props
eq-Pr5)
A set a ∈ A b ∈ A
τ ( Îd(A, a, b) ) = Id(A, a, b) props
eq-Pr6)
p(x) props [x ∈ B] B set
τ ( ̂(∃x ∈ B)p(x)) = (∃x ∈ B)τ (p(x))props
eq-Pr7)
p(x) ∈ props [x ∈ B] B set
τ ( ̂(∀x ∈ B)p(x)) = (∀x ∈ B)τ (p(x))props
In the realizability interpretation of mTT we need to define a subset of natural numbers includ-
ing codes of mTT-sets in order to define the subset of codes of small propositions closed under
quantification on sets. The existence of such a subset of set codes says that the realizability inter-
pretation is actually interpreting an extension ofmTT with a collection of sets. In order to simplify
the definition of the realizability interpretation, we interpret an extension of mTT, which we call
mTTs, with the addition of the collection Set of set codes whose related rules are the following. We
don’t give any elimination and conversion rule as those of universes a` la Tarski in [18] since it would
not be validated in the model (because we do not have least fix-points in ÎD1).
Collection of sets
F-Se) Set col
Elements of the collection of sets are generated as follows:
See) N̂0 ∈ Set Ses) N̂1 ∈ Set
Sel)
a ∈ Set
L̂ist(a) ∈ Set
Seu)
a ∈ Set b ∈ Set
a+̂b ∈ Set
SeΣ)
a(x) Set [x ∈ B] B set
̂(Σx ∈ B)a(x) ∈ Set
SeΠ)
a(x) Set [x ∈ B] B set
̂(Πx ∈ B)a(x) ∈ Set
sp-i-p)
p ∈ props
p ∈ Set
mTT can be viewed as a predicative version of the Calculus of Constructions [4], for short CoC.
The main difference with respect to CoC is thatmTT distinguishes between sets and collections in a
way similar to the distinction between sets and classes in axiomatic set theory. However, all types of
mTT, i.e. small propositions, propositions, sets and collections, are predicative entities in the sense
that their elements can be generated in an inductive way by a finite number of rules. According
to the notion of set in Bishop [3] and Martin-Lo¨f [16], all mTT-types are actually sets, and in
fact mTT-types can be interpreted as sets in the intensional version of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory in
[18]. The mTT-distinction between sets and collections, and the corresponding distinction between
small propositions and propositions, is motivated by the need of distinguishing between predicative
entities whose notion of element is a closed concept, and these are called sets, and those entities
whose notion of element is an open concept, and these are called collections. The motivating idea is
that a set is inductively generated by a finite number of rules whose associated inductive principle
does not vary when the theorymTT is extended with new entities (sets, collections or propositions).
On the contrary a collection is inductively generated by a finite number of rules which may vary
when the theory is extended with new entities. Typical examples of collections are universes (of sets
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or propositions): if we extend the theory mTT with a new small proposition, then we need to add
a new rule inserting this new small proposition in the collection of small propositions.
We recall from [14] that the distinction between propositions and sets is crucial to avoid the
validity of choice principles.
Finally, it is worth noting that in mTT we restrict substitution term equality rules to explicit
substitution term equality rules of the form
sub)
c(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C(x1, . . . , xn) [x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1) ]
a1 = b1 ∈ A1 . . . an = bn ∈ An(a1, . . . , an−1)
c(a1, . . . , an) = c(b1, . . . , bn) ∈ C(a1, . . . , an)
in place of usual term equality rules preserving term constructions typical of Martin-Lo¨f’s type
theory in [18]. This restriction, and in particular the absence of the so called ξ-rule of lambda-terms
ξ
c = c′ ∈ C [x ∈ B]
λxB .c = λxB .c′ ∈ (Πx ∈ B)C
seems to be crucial to prove consistency of mTT with AC+CT, as advocated in [14], by means of
a realizability semantics a` la Kleene, but this is still an open problem (the realizability semantics
given here does not help to solve this since it can not validate AC on all types). It is worth to recall
from [10] that our restriction of term equality does not affect the possibility of adoptingmTT as the
intensional level of a two-level constructive foundation as intended in [14]. Indeed the term equality
rules of mTT suffice to interpret an extensional level including extensional equality of functions, as
that represented by emTT, by means of the quotient model described in [10] and studied abstractly
in [12, 11, 13].
2.2 The extensional level of the Minimalist Foundation
Here we briefly describe the extensional level emTT of the Minimalist Foundation. This is an exten-
sional dependent type theory extending extensional Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory in [17] with primitive
(proof-irrelevant) propositions, power-collections and quotients.
The rules of emTT are formulated by using the same kinds of judgements used for mTT. The
main peculiar characteristics of emTT in comparison to mTT are the following.
1. A primary difference between emTT and mTT is the usual difference between the so called
intensional version of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory [18] and its extensional one in [17] and this is
the fact that the definitional equality of terms
a = b ∈ A [Γ]
is no longer decidable in emTT as it is in the intensional mTT. This is in turn due to the
fact that the propositional equality of emTT as that of [17], called Eq(A, a, b), is extensional
in the sense that the provability of Eq(A, a, b) [Γ] in emTT is equivalent to the derivation of
the judgement a = b ∈ A [Γ]. Instead, in mTT only the derivation of the definitional equality
judgement a = b ∈ A [Γ] implies internally the provability of the intensional propositional
equality Id(A, a, b) [Γ] under a generic context.
2. Another peculiar feature of emTT employs the distinction between propositions and sets: this
is the addition of proof-irrelevance for propositions captured by the following rules
prop-mono)
φ prop [Γ] p ∈ φ [Γ] q ∈ φ [Γ]
p = q ∈ φ [Γ]
prop-true)
φ prop p ∈ φ
true ∈ φ
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saying that a proof of a proposition is unique and equal to a canonical proof term called true.
Of course, these rules can not be added to an extensional theory identifying propositions with
sets as Martin-Lo¨f’s one in [17], because they would trivialize all constructors. Moreover, these
rules are not present in the intensional level mTT because proof-irrelevance is a typical ex-
tensional condition. Indeed, emTT-propositions can be thought of as quotients of intensional
propositions under the trivial equivalence relation between proofs.
3. Other key differences between the type theories mTT and emTT are the addition in emTT
of quotient sets
A/ρ set [Γ]
provided that ρ is a small equivalence relation ρ props [x ∈ A, y ∈ A] on the set A, and the
addition of the power-collection of the singleton and of the power-collection of a generic set A
P(1) A→ P(1)
4. A further difference between the type theories mTT and emTT concerns the equality rules
between terms. Indeed in emTT equality rules between terms are the usual ones typical of
an extensional type theory in [17] preserving all term constructors. In particular, equality of
lambda-functions is extensional, namely it is possible to prove
(∀x ∈ A)Eq(B(x), f(x) , g(x)) → Eq( (Πx ∈ A)B(x) , λx.f(x) , λx.g(x) )
This proposition is not necessarily provable at the intensional level mTT when substituting
the extensional propositional equality Eq(A, a, b) with the intensional one Id(A, a, b).
We end by recalling from [10] that a model for mTT can be turned into a model for emTT by
using the interpretation of emTT into mTT described in [10]. Therefore in the following we are
going to define a realizability interpretation just for mTT, to get one also for emTT.
2.3 Untyped syntax of mTTs
Usually in type theory the syntax is introduced in fieri ; for example terms are introduced typic-
ally after deriving some conditions or constraints which are required to define them. However for
semantical purposes it looks more convenient to present the syntax a priori in a partial way by
eliminating parts of usual restrictions.
Therefore, since we want to define a realizability interpretation for mTTs, we introduce here
the syntax of all mTTs-type and term constructors in a partial way and we refer the reader to look
at [10] for all the mTT-rules. Then we will define a partial interpretation for terms of our extended
syntax and check that this interpretation is well defined in case the constraints for introducing them
are validated by the model.
Definition 2.1. Let [x] be a context, i. e. [x] = [x1, ..., xn] is a possibly empty list of distinct variables.
Terms, small propositions, sets, propositions and collections in context are defined according to the
following conditions. If
1. t [x] , t′ [x] , t′′ [x] , s [x, y] , s′ [x, y] , r [x, y, z] , q [x, y, z, u] are terms in context;
2. φ [x] , φ′ [x] , ψ [x, y] are small propositions in context;
3. A [x] , A′ [x] , B [x, y] are sets in context;
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4. η [x] , η′ [x] , ρ [x, y] are propositions in context;
5. D [x] , E [x, y] are collections in context,
then
1. xi [x] is a term in context;
the empty set eliminator emp0(t) [x] is a term in context;
the singleton constant ⋆ [x] and the singleton eliminator ElN1(t, t
′) [x] are terms in context;
the zero constant 0 [x], the successor constructor succ(t) [x] and the eliminator of natural num-
bers ElN(t, t
′, (y, z)r) [x] are terms in context1;
the lambda abstraction of dependent product λy.s [x] and its application Ap(t, t′) [x] are terms
in context;
the pairing of strong indexed sum 〈t, t′〉 [x] and its eliminator ElΣ(t, (y, z)r) [x] are terms in
context;
the first injection of binary disjoint sum inl(t) [x] and its second injection inr(t) [x] and its
eliminator El+(t, (y)s, (y)s
′) [x] are terms in context;
the empty list ǫ [x], the list constructor cons(t, t′) [x] and its eliminator ElList(t, t
′, (y, z, u)q) [x]
are terms in context;
the false eliminator r0(t) [x] is a term in context;
the pairing of conjunction 〈t,∧ t
′〉 [x], and its first and second projections π∧1 (t) [x] and π
∧
2 (t) [x]
are terms in context;
the first injection of disjunction inl∨(t) [x], the second injection of disjunction inr∨(t) [x] and
its eliminator El∨(t, (y)s, (y)s
′) [x] are terms in context;
the lambda abstraction of implication λ→y.s [x] and its application Ap→(t, t
′) [x] are terms in
context;
the pairing of existential quantification 〈t,∃ t
′〉 [x] and its eliminator El∃(t, (y, z)r) [x] are terms
in context;
the lambda abstraction of universal quantification λ∀y.s [x] and its application Ap∀(t, t
′) [x] are
terms in context;
the Propositional Identity term constructor id(t) [x] and its eliminator ElId(t, t
′, t′′, (y)s) [x] 2
are terms in context;
1The rules for these constructors derive from those of List(N1) in mTT by identifying 0 with ǫ, succ(t) with
cons(t, ⋆) and ElN (t, t
′, (y, z)r) with ElList(N1)(t, t
′, (y, y′, z)r).
2In the rules for Id(A, a, b) of mTT the eliminator ElId(p, (x)c) is substituted by an eliminator ElId(a, b, p, (x)c)
with explicit reference to a ∈ A and b ∈ A. The rules remain the same.
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the empty set code N̂0[x], the singleton code N̂1[x], the natural numbers set code N̂ [x], the
dependent product code (Π̂y ∈ A)s[x], the dependent sum code (Σ̂y ∈ A)s[x], the disjoint sum
code t+̂t′[x], the list code L̂ist(t)[x], the falsum code ⊥̂, the conjunction code t∧̂t′, the disjunc-
tion code t∨̂t′, the implication code t→̂t′, the existential quantification code (∃̂y ∈ A)s [x], the
universal quantification code (∀̂y ∈ A)s [x] and the propositional identity code Îd(A, t, t′) [x] are
terms in context;
2. ⊥ [x] is a small proposition in context;
τ(t) [x] is a small proposition in context;
φ ∧ φ′ [x], φ ∨ φ′ [x] and φ→ φ′ [x] are small propositions in context;
(∃y ∈ A)ψ [x] and (∀y ∈ A)ψ [x] are small propositions in context;
Id(A, t, t′) [x] is a small proposition in context;
3. φ [x] is a set in context;
N0 [x] , N1 [x] and N [x] are sets in context;
(Πy ∈ A)B [x], (Σy ∈ A)B [x], A+A′ [x] and List(A) [x] are sets in context;
4. φ [x] is a proposition in context;
η ∧ η′ [x], η ∨ η′ [x] and η → η′ [x] are propositions in context;
(∃y ∈ D) ρ [x] and (∀y ∈ D) ρ [x] are propositions in context;
Id(D, t, t′) [x] is a proposition in context;
5. η [x] is a collection in context;
A [x] is a collection in context;
Set [x] is a collection in context;
props [x] is a collection in context;
A→ props [x] is a collection in context;
(Σy ∈ D)E [x] is a collection in context.
For sets in context A [x] we define an abbreviation Â [x] as follows:
1. ⊥̂, N̂0, N̂1 and N̂ were already defined;
2. ̂((Πy ∈ A)B) = (Π̂y ∈ A) B̂, ̂((Σy ∈ A)B) = (Σ̂y ∈ A) B̂,
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3. Â+A′ = Â+̂Â′, L̂ist(A) = L̂ist(Â),
4. φ̂ ∧ φ′ = φ̂ ∧̂ φ̂′, φ̂ ∨ φ′ = φ̂ ∨̂ φ̂′, φ̂→ φ′ = φ̂ →̂ φ̂′,
5. ̂((∃y ∈ A)ψ) = (∃̂y ∈ A) ψ̂, ̂((∀y ∈ A)ψ) = (∀̂y ∈ A) ψ̂, ̂Id(A, t, s) = Îd (A, t, s),
6. τ̂(t) = t.
It is clear that the previous definition is overabundant with respect to the common use in type
theory. We introduced some terms which we will never find in any standard type theory, as for
example the term 0∧̂ElN1(λx.x, λ→y.y) which is obtained by gluing together terms which usually
have types which are not compatible. For example 0 is usually typed as a natural number, while ∧̂
connects codes for small propositions.
3 The realizability interpretation for mTTs
The preliminary step in the presentation of the Kleene realizability interpretation consists in present-
ing the theory of Inductive Definitions ÎD1 in which we will interpret mTT
s.
3.1 The system ÎD1
The system ÎD1 is a predicative fragment of second-order arithmetic, more precisely it is the predic-
ative fragment of second-order arithmetic extending Peano arithmetics with some (not necessarily
least) fix points for each positive arithmetical operator. Its number terms are number variables (we
assume that these variables are equal to those of mTTs ), the constant 0 and the terms built by
applying the unary successor functional symbol succ and the binary sum and product functional
symbols + and ∗ to number terms. Set terms are only set variables X,Y, Z.... The arithmetical
formulas are obtained starting from t = s and tεX with t, s number terms and X a set variable,
by applying the connectives ∧,∨,¬,→ and the number quantifiers ∀x, ∃x. Moreover let us give the
following two definitions.
Definition 3.1. An occurrence of a set variable X is positive in an arithmetical formula ϕ if and
only if ϕ is tεX for some number term t or ϕ is ψ ∧ ψ′, ψ′ ∧ ψ, ψ ∨ ψ′, ψ′ ∨ ψ , ψ′ → ψ, ∃xψ or
∀xψ and the occurrence of X is a positive occurrence of X in ψ.
Definition 3.2. An arithmetical formula ϕ with exactly one free number variable n and one free
set variable X which occurs only positively is called an admissible formula.
In order to define the system ÎD1 we add to the language of arithmetic a unary predicate symbol
Pϕ for every admissible formula ϕ . The atomic formulas of ÎD1 are
1. t = s with t and s number terms,
2. tεX with t a number term and X a set variable,
3. Pϕ(t) with t a number term and ϕ an admissible formula.
All formulas of ÎD1 are obtained by atomic formulas by applying connectives, number quantifiers
and set quantifiers.
The axioms of ÎD1 are the axioms of Peano Arithmetic plus the following three axiom schemata:
11
1. Comprehension schema: for all formulas ϕ(x) of ÎD1 without set quantifiers
∃X∀x(xεX ↔ ϕ(x))
2. Induction schema: for all formulas ϕ(x) of ÎD1
(ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ϕ(succ(x))))→ ∀xϕ(x)
3. Fix point schema: for all admissible formulas ϕ
ϕ[Pϕ/X ]↔ Pϕ(x)
where ϕ[Pϕ/X ] is the result of substituting in ϕ all instances of xεX with Pϕ(x).
The system ÎD1 allows us to define predicates as fix points, by using axiom schema 3, if they
are presented in a appropriate way (i. e. using admissible formulas).
A definable class C of ÎD1 is a formal writing {x|ϕ(x)} where ϕ(x) is a formula of ÎD1. In this
case we write xεC as a shorthand for ϕ(x).
Notation of computable operators in ÎD1.
As it is well known, it is certainly possible to express a Go¨delian coding of recursive functions
in ÎD1 using Kleene’s predicate since it is already possible to do this in PA. In particular we
can consider a definitional extension of ÎD1 (which we still call ÎD1) in which there are terms with
Kleene’s brackets {t}(s) and there is a predicate {t}(s) ↓ stating that the term with Kleene’s brackets
is well defined (s is in the domain of the recursive function coded by t). We will write {t}(s1, ..., sn)
as a shorthand defined by induction: it is {t}(s1) if n = 1 while if n > 1 and if we have already
defined {t}(s1, ..., sn), then {t}(s1, ..., sn+1) = {{t}(s1, ..., sn)}(sn+1). We denote by succ a numeral
for which in {succ}(x) = succ(x) in ÎD1.
As we well know, the s-m-n lemma (see e. g. [19]) gives the structure of a partial combinatorial
algebra to natural numbers endowed with Kleene application and this structure can be expressed in
ÎD1. In particular we can find numerals p,p1,p2 representing a fixed primitive recursive bijective
pairing function with primitive recursive first and second projections. We will write p1(x), p2(x) and
〈x, y〉 as abbreviations for {p1}(x), {p2}(x) and {p}(x, y) respectively. It is also possible to define a
numeral ite3 representing the definition by cases ({ite}(n,m, l) ≃ 4m if n = 0, {ite}(n,m, l) ≃ l if
n 6= 0). We can also encode recursively finite list of natural numbers with natural numbers in such
a way that the empty list is coded by 0 and the concatenation is a recursive function which can be
coded by a numeral cnc. We have moreover numerals rec and listrec representing natural numbers
recursion and lists recursion. These numbers in particular satisfy the following requirements:
1. {rec}(n,m, 0) ≃ n;
2. {rec}(n,m, k + 1) ≃ {m}(k, {rec}(n,m, k));
3. {listrec}(n,m, 0) ≃ n;
4. {listrec}(n,m, cnc(k, l)) ≃ {m}(k, l, {listrec}(n,m, k)).
For this representation of lists, the component functions (−)j , turn out to be recursive.
Moreover we can always define λ-terms Λn.t in ÎD1 for terms t built with numerals, variables and
Kleene application, in such a way that {Λx.t}(n) ≃ t[n/x] and {Λx1...Λxn.t}(n) ≃ Λx2...Λxn.t[n/x1].
3if then else
4a ≃ b means that a ↓ if and only if b ↓ and in this case a = b in ÎD1.
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3.2 The definition of interpretation
The realizability interpretation for mTTs we are going to describe is a modification of Beeson’s
realizability semantics [2] for the extensional version of first order Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with one
universe [17]. So it will be given in ÎD1 as Beeson’s one. Here we describe the key points of such
an interpretation on which we follow Beeson’s semantics:
- all types ofmTTs are interpreted as quotients of definable classes of ÎD1, intended as classes of
“their realizers”. In particular we use Beeson’s technique of interpreting Martin-Lo¨f’s universe
to interpret the collection of (codes for) small propositions of mTTs. In order to do this it is
crucial to have fix points and hence this is why we work in the theory ÎD1;
- terms are interpreted as (codes) of recursive functions;
- equality between terms in context is interpreted as extensional equality of recursive functions;
- the interpretation of substitution will be proven to be equivalent to the substitution in inter-
pretation;
- we interpret λ-abstraction by using s-m-n lemma of computability, but then, in order to
validate the condition of the previous point, we impose equality of type-theoretic functions to
be extensional. Therefore the principle of Extensional Equality of Functions will turn out to
be valid in our model.
Instead we do not follow Beeson’s semantics in the interpretation of propositions:
- in order to validate formal Church Thesis we interpret propositions as trivial5 quotients of
original Kleene realizability. As a consequence Martin-Lo¨f’s isomorphism of propositions-as-
sets together with the validity of the Axiom of Choice is not validated in our realizability
semantics contrary to Beeson’s one.
We can summarize the interpretation of terms and types with the following table:
Terms (codes) of recursive functions
Collections Quotients of definable classes (C,≃)
Propositions quotients of definable classes on trivial ≃
The interpretation of terms
Before giving the interpretation of mTTs-terms, we need to present explicitly a convention about
how to encode mTTs-sets with numerals. We will code sets as {p}(a, 〈b1, ..., bn〉), where a is a
number coding a particular constructor and 〈b1, ..., bn〉 is a lists of codes for ingredients needed by
the constructor itself. The following table makes evident the choices for a:
N0, N1, N Π Σ + List ⊥ ∧ ∨ → ∃ ∀ Id
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Notice that codes for small propositions must have a > 5.
We can now proceed to the definition of the interpretation of mTTs-terms.
5A quotient is trivial if it is determined by a trivial relation i. e. a relation for which all pairs of elements are
equivalent.
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Definition 3.3. Terms in context t[x1, ..., xn] are interpreted as
I(t[x1, ..., xn]) = Λx1...Λxn.I(t)
where I(t) are terms of the extended language of ÎD1 defined as follows
1. If x is a variable, then I(x) = x;
2. I(emp0(t)) = I(r0) = 0;
3. I(⋆) = 0 and I(ElN1(t, t
′)) = I(t′);
4. I(0) = 0 and I(succ(t)) = {succ}(I(t)),
I(ElN (t, t
′, (y, z)r)) = {rec}(I(t′),Λy.Λz.I(r), I(t));
5. I(λy.s) = I(λ→y.s) = I(λ∀y.s) = Λy.I(s),
I(Ap(t, t′)) = I(Ap→(t, t
′)) = I(Ap∀(t, t
′)) = {I(t)}(I(t′));
6. I(〈t, t′〉) = I(〈t,∧ t
′〉) = I(〈t,∃ t
′〉) = {p}(I(t), I(t′)),
I(ElΣ(t, (y, z)r)) = I(El∃(t, (y, z)r)) = {Λy.Λz.I(r)}({p1}(I(t)), {p2}(I(t))),
I(π∧1 (t)) = {p1}(I(t)),
I(π∧2 (t)) = {p2}(I(t));
7. I(inl(t)) = I(inl∨(t)) = {p}(0, I(t)),
I(inr(t)) = I(inr∨(t)) = {p}(1, I(t)),
I(El+(t, (y)s, (y)s
′)) = I(El∨(t, (y)s, (y)s
′)) =
{ite}(p1(I(t)), {Λy.I(s)}({p2}(I(t))), {Λy.I(s
′)}({p2}(I(t))));
8. I(ǫ) = 0 and I(cons(t, t′)) = {cnc}(I(t), I(t′)),
ElList(t, t
′, (y, z, u)q) = {listrec}(I(t′),Λy.Λz.Λu.I(q), I(t));
9. I(id(t)) = 0,
I(ElId(t, t
′, t′′, (y)s)) = {Λy.I(s)}(I(t));
10. I(N̂0) = {p}(1, 0), I(N̂1) = {p}(1, 1) and I(N̂ ) = {p}(1, 2),
I((Π̂y ∈ A)s) = {p}(2, ({p}(I(Â), (Λy.I(s))))),
I((Σ̂y ∈ A)s) = {p}(3, ({p}(I(Â), (Λy.I(s))))),
I(t+̂t′) = {p}(4, ({p}(I(t), I(t′))),
I(L̂ist(t)) = {p}(5, I(t)),
I(⊥̂) = {p}(6, 0),
I(t∧̂t′) = {p}(7, ({p}(I(t), I(t′))),
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I(t∨̂t′) = {p}(8, ({p}(I(t), I(t′))),
I(t→̂t′) = {p}(9, ({p}(I(t), I(t′))),
I((∃̂y ∈ A)s) = {p}(10, ({p}(I(Â), (Λy.I(s))))),
I((∀̂y ∈ A)s) = {p}(11, ({p}(I(Â), (Λy.I(s))))),
I(Îd(A, t, t′)) = {p}(12, ({p}(I(Â), ({p}(I(t), I(t′)))))),
For the sake of example let us consider the interpretation of the term in context t[x, y, z] defined
as Îd(Id(N, x, x), y, z)[x, y, z]:
I(t)[x, y, z]) = Λx.Λy.Λz.I(Îd(Id(N, x, x), y, z))
= Λx.Λy.Λz.{p}(12, {p}(I( ̂Id(N, x, x)), {p}(y, z))
= Λx.Λy.Λz.{p}(12, {p}(I(Îd(N, x, x)), {p}(y, z)))
= Λx.Λy.Λz.{p}(12, {p}({p}(12, {p}(I(N̂), {p}(x, x))), {p}(y, z)))
= Λx.Λy.Λz.{p}(12, {p}({p}(12, {p}({p}(1, 2), {p}(x, x))), {p}(y, z))).
We say that an interpretation of a term in context t[x] is well defined if I(t[x]) ↓ is provable in
ÎD1. Notice that the interpretations of terms in non-empty contexts are always well defined.
Notice moreover that in ÎD1
1. I(ElN1(⋆, t
′)) ≃ I(t′);
2. I(ElN (0, t, (y, z)s)) ≃ I(t);
3. I(ElN (succ(t
′), t, (y, z)s)) ≃ I(s)[I(t′)/y, I(ElN (t
′, t, (y, z)s))/z]
4. I(Ap(λy.s, t)) ≃ I(s)[I(t)/y];
5. I(Ap→(λ→y.s, t)) ≃ I(s)[I(t)/y];
6. I(Ap∀(λ∀y.s, t)) ≃ I(s)[I(t)/y];
7. I(ElΣ(〈t, t
′〉, (y, z)r)) ≃ I(r)[I(t)/y, I(t′)/z];
8. I(El∃(〈t,∃ t
′〉, (y, z)r)) ≃ I(r)[I(t)/y, I(t′)/z];
9. I(π∧1 (〈t,∧ t
′〉)) ≃ I(t);
10. I(π∧2 (〈t,∧ t
′〉)) ≃ I(t′);
11. I(El+(inl(t), (y)s, (y)s
′)) ≃ I(s)[I(t)/y];
12. I(El+(inr(t), (y)s, (y)s
′)) ≃ I(s′)[I(t)/y];
13. I(El∨(inl∨(t), (y)s, (y)s
′)) ≃ I(s)[I(t)/y];
14. I(El∨(inr∨(t), (y)s, (y)s
′)) ≃ I(s′)[I(t)/y];
15. I(ElId(t, id(t), (y)s)) ≃ I(s)[I(t)/y];
16. I(ElList(ǫ, t
′, (y, z, u)q)) ≃ I(t′);
17. I(ElList(cons(t, t
′′), t′, (y, z, u)q)) ≃ I(q)[I(t)/y, I(t′′)/z, I(ElList(t, t
′, (y, z, u)q))/u].
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The interpretation of sets
Here we define the interpretation of sets in mTTs with the exception of those obtained as τ(p) for
some term p. Every such a set is interpreted as a definable quotient of a definable class of ÎD1 (and
actually of HA). This means that every set A is interpreted as a pair
I(A) = (J (A) , ∼I(A) )
where J (A) is a definable class of ÎD1 and ∼I(A) is a definable equivalence relation on the class
J (A).
Since sets inmTT include small propositions, here we also define a realizability relation between
natural numbers and propositions. Indeed it is more convenient to define the realizability inter-
pretation of propositions by adopting an extension of usual Kleene’s interpretation of intuitionistic
connectives.
Note that we use the notation I(A)[s/y] to mean the definable class in which we substitute y
with s in the membership and in the equivalence relation of I(A).
Definition 3.4. We define in ÎD1 a realizability relation n  φ between natural numbers and small
propositions, by induction on the definition of small propositions φ, simultaneously together with the
definition of the following formulas nεJ (A) and n ∼I(A) m for sets A, by induction on the definition
of sets (with the exception of those obtained using τ(p) for some term p), as follows:
(⊥) n  ⊥ is ⊥;
(∧) n  φ ∧ φ′ is (p1(n)  φ) ∧ (p2(n)  φ
′);
(∨) n  φ ∨ φ′ is (p1(n) = 0 ∧ p2(n)  φ) ∨ (p1(n) 6= 0 ∧ p2(n)  φ
′);
(→) n  φ→ φ′ is ∀t ((t  φ) → ({n}(t)  φ′));
(∃) n  (∃x ∈ A)ψ is p1(n) εJ (A) ∧ (p2(n)  ψ)[p1(n)/x];
(∀) n  (∀x ∈ A)ψ is ∀x (x εJ (A) → ({n}(x)  ψ));
(Id) n  Id(A, t, s) is I(t) ∼I(A) I(s);
(N0) n εJ (N0) is ⊥ and
n ∼I(N0) m is ⊥;
(N1) n εJ (N1) is n = 0 and
n ∼I(N1) m is n = 0 ∧ n = m;
(N) n εJ (N) is n = n and
n ∼I(N) m is n = m;
(Π) n εJ ((Πx ∈ A)B) is
∀x (x εJ (A)→ {n}(x) ∈ J (B)) ∧ ∀x∀y (x ∼I(A) y → {n}(x) ∼I(B) {n}(y)}
6 and
6Note that the variable x may be in I(B) here and in the following definition for Π and Σ sets, as it comes from
the definition of the untyped syntax.
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n ∼I((Πx∈A)B) m is
n εJ ((Πx ∈ A)B) ∧mεJ ((Πx ∈ A)B) ∧ ∀x (x εJ (A)→ {n}(x) ∼I(B) {m}(x));
(Σ) n εJ ((Σx ∈ A)B) is p1(n) εJ (A) ∧ ∀x (x ∼I(A) p1(n)→ p2(n) εJ (B)) and
n ∼I((Σx∈A)B) m is the conjunction of n εJ ((Σx ∈ A)B) ∧mεJ ((Σx ∈ A)B) and
p1(n) ∼I(A) p1(m) ∧ ∀x (x ∼I(A) p1(n)→ p2(n) ∼I(B) p2(m));
(+) n εJ (A+A′) is (p1(n) = 0 ∧ p2(n) εJ (A)) ∨ (p1(n) = 1 ∧ p2(n) εJ (A
′)) and
n ∼I(A+A′) m is the conjunction of n εJ (A+A
′) ∧mεJ (A+A′) ∧ p1(n) = p1(m) and
(p1(n) = 0 ∧ p2(n) ∼I(A) p2(m)) ∨ (p1(n) = 1 ∧ p2(n) ∼I(A′) p2(m));
(List) n εJ (List(A)) is ∀j (j < lh(n) → (n)j εJ (A)) and
n ∼I(List(A)) m is the conjunction of n εJ (List(A)) ∧ mεJ (List(A)) and
lh(n) = lh(m) ∧ ∀j (j < lh(n) → (n)j ∼I(A) (m)j);
(ψ) n εJ (ψ) is n  ψ and
n ∼I(ψ) m is n εJ (ψ) ∧ mεJ (ψ) (i. e. proof-irrelevance).
Remark 3.1. We can notice some preliminary properties of this realizability interpretation:
1. for every set A we have that ∼I(A) is really a definable equivalence relation on the definable
class J (A), in fact
n εJ (A) ⊢
ÎD1
n ∼I(A) n
n ∼I(A) m ⊢ÎD1
m ∼I(A) n
n ∼I(A) m ∧ m ∼I(A) l ⊢ÎD1
n ∼I(A) l
2. for every set A we have that
n ∼I(A) m ⊢ÎD1
n εJ (A) ∧mεJ (A)
3. if numerical sets are defined according to the following conditions
(a) N0, N1 and N are numerical sets;
(b) if A and B are numerical sets, then (Σx ∈ A)B, A + B and List(A) (if they are well
defined) are numerical sets,
then the equality of the interpretation of numerical sets is numerical, which means that
n ∼I(A) m ⊢ÎD1
n = m
4. for all propositions ψ, the equivalence relation ∼I(ψ) is trivial (i. e. all pairs of elements of I(ψ)
are equivalent). This means that uniqueness of propositional proofs, called proof-irrelevance,
is imposed.
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The encoding of all mTTs-sets
In the previous sections we have seen the interpretation of mTTs-sets which include small propos-
itions. It remains to define the interpretation of proper collections, including that of sets, small
propositions and small propositional functions on a set.
The interpretation of the collection of small propositions Set in ÎD1 is the most difficult point and
to define it we mimick the technique adopted by Beeson [2] to interpret Martin-Lo¨f’s universe via a fix
point of some arithmetical operator with positive parameters. Hence, it is to define the interpretation
of Set, and in turn of the collection of small propositions props and of small propositional functions
A→ props on a set A, that we need to employ the full power of ÎD1 with fix points.
The idea is to define a ÎD1-formula which defines codes of sets with their interpretation as a
fix point. It appears necessary to define called Set(n) expressing that n is a code of an mTTs-set
together with its realizability interpretation in ÎD1. Observe that in mTT
s the type of all sets is
not present and hence no mTTs-type will be interpreted as {n|Set(n)}. As in Beeson’s semantics,
to define the formula Set(n) of set codes with their arithmetical interpretation in ÎD1 we need to
encode membership and equality of sets: tεn and t ≡n s. In turn in order to define them, we need
to represent the notion of a family of sets used to interpret an mTTs-dependent set.
A family of sets coded by m on a set coded by n could be described by the formula
Set(n) ∧ ∀t (t ε n → Set({m}(t)))∧
∀t∀s (t ≡n s → (∀j (j ε {m}(t) ↔ j ε {m}(s)) ∧ ∀j∀k (j ≡{m}(t) k ↔ j ≡{m}(s) k))).
But in this formula not all occurrences of t ε n and t ≡n s are positive. However it is classically
equivalent to the conjunction of the formula Set(n) ∧ (¬t ε n ∨ Set({m}(t))) and the formula
∀t∀s (¬t ≡n s ∨ (P1 ∧ P2)) where P1 is
∀j ((¬j ε {m}(t) ∨ j ε {m}(s)) ∧ (¬j ε {m}(s) ∨ j ε {m}(t)))
and P2 is
∀j∀k ((¬j ≡{m}(t) k ∨ j ≡{m}(s) k) ∧ (¬j ≡{m}(s) k ∨ j ≡{m}(t) k))
simply substituting all the instances of the schema a→ b with the classically equivalent ¬a∨ b. Now
the trick consists in defining some predicates t 6 ε n and t 6≡n s mimicking the negations of t ε n and
t ≡n s as fix point predicates, too, in order to get a a positive arithmetical operator. Note that
the use of a classical arithmetic theory with fix points seems unavoidable to be able to interpret
the collection of sets via a positive arithmetical operator.
From now on we write
Fam(m,n) ≡ Set(n) ∧ ∀t (t 6 ε n ∨ Set({m}(t))) ∧ ∀t∀s (t 6≡n s ∨ (P
′
1 ∧ P
′
2))
where P ′1 and P
′
2 are obtained from P1 and P2 by substituting negated istances of membership and
of equality predicates with their mentioned primitive negated versions
P ′1 ≡ ∀j ((j 6 ε {m}(t) ∨ j ε {m}(s)) ∧ (j 6 ε {m}(s) ∨ j ε {m}(t)))
P ′2 ≡ ∀j∀k ((j 6≡{m}(t) k ∨ j ≡{m}(s) k) ∧ (j 6≡{m}(s) k ∨ j ≡{m}(t) k)).
In order to define the positive clauses for the codes of sets we must introduce some notations.
In this way we transform the clauses for realizability for sets automatically in the clauses needed to
define the fix points Set(n), tεn, t 6 ε n, t ≡n s and t 6≡n s.
First of all, we define a function [ ] which assigns a value to a set according to the table in section
3.2 as follows.
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1. if σ is one of the symbols A, A′, B, φ, φ′, ψ, t, s, then [σ] is a, a′, {b}(x), c, c′, {d}(x), e, f
respectively;
2. if σ is N0, N1, N , (Πx ∈ A)B, (Σx ∈ A)B, A + A
′, List(A) then [σ] is 〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈1, 2〉,
〈2, 〈a, b〉〉, 〈3, 〈a, b〉〉, 〈4, 〈a, a′〉〉, 〈5, a〉 respectively;
3. if σ is ⊥, φ∧ φ′, φ∨ φ′, φ→ φ′, (∃x ∈ A)ψ, (∀x ∈ A)ψ, Id(A, t, s) then [σ] is 〈6, 0〉, 〈7, 〈c, c′〉〉,
〈8, 〈c, c′〉〉, 〈9, 〈c, c′〉〉, 〈10, 〈a, d〉〉, 〈11, 〈a, d〉〉, 〈12, 〈a, 〈e, f〉〉〉 respectively.
We denote by [ ]−1 the inverse function of [ ]. Now, all clauses in the realizability interpretation of
sets are defined using formulas which are obtained starting from arithmetical formulas or primitive
formulas with ε or ∼, by using connectives, first order quantifiers or explicit instances of substitution
in x. For such formulas ϕ we define ϕ+ as follows:
1. if ϕ is arithmetical, then ϕ+ is defined as ϕ itself. If ϕ is a primitive formulas with ε or ∼ we
will transform εJ (σ) and ∼I(σ) in ε [σ] and ≡[σ] respectively, in order to obtain ϕ
+;
2. (ϕ[α/x])+ is ϕ+[α/x];
3. (ϕ ∧ ϕ′)+ is ϕ+ ∧ ϕ′+;
4. (ϕ ∨ ϕ′)+ is ϕ+ ∨ ϕ′+;
5. (ϕ→ ϕ′)+ is ϕ+ ∨ ϕ′+;
6. (∀uϕ)+ is ∀uϕ+ for every variable u;
7. (∃uϕ)+ is ∃uϕ+ for every variable u;
where ϕ is defined by the following clauses:
1. if ϕ is an arithmetical formula ϕ is ¬ϕ;
2. if ϕ is a relation between two terms through ε, 6 ε, ≡ or 6≡, then ϕ is obtained by transforming
them in 6 ε, ε, 6≡ or ≡ respectively;
3. ϕ ∧ ϕ′ is ϕ ∨ ϕ′;
4. ϕ ∨ ϕ′ is ϕ ∧ ϕ′;
5. ∀uϕ is ∃uϕ for every variable u;
6. ∃uϕ is ∀uϕ for every variable u;
We can now define the positive clauses we needed. For τ equal to 〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈1, 2〉, 〈2, 〈a, b〉〉,
〈3, 〈a, b〉〉, 〈4, 〈a, a′〉〉, 〈5, a〉, 〈6, 0〉, 〈7, 〈c, c′〉〉, 〈8, 〈c, c′〉〉, 〈9, 〈c, c′〉〉, 〈10, 〈a, d〉〉, 〈11, 〈a, d〉〉, 〈12, 〈a, 〈e, f〉〉〉
we have the following clauses7:
1. Set(τ) if Cond(τ);
7By nεJ ([τ ]−1) and n ∼I([τ ]−1) m we mean the right-hand side of the respective clause in the realizability
interpretation of sets, taking into account that for small propositions membership coincides with the realizability
relation.
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2. n ε τ if Cond(τ) ∧ (n εJ ([τ ]−1))+;
3. n 6 ε τ if Cond(τ) ∧ (n εJ ([τ ]−1))+;
4. n ≡τ m if Cond(τ) ∧ (n ∼I([τ ]−1) m)
+;
5. n 6≡τ m if Cond(τ) ∧ (n ∼I([τ ]−1) m)+;
where Cond(τ) is
1. ⊤ if τ has first component 1 or 6;
2. Fam(b, a) if τ has first component 2 or 3;
3. Set(a) ∧ Set(a′) if τ has first component 4;
4. Set(a) if τ has first component 5;
5. Set(c) ∧ Set(c′) ∧ π1(c) > 5 ∧ π1(c
′) > 5 if τ has first component 7, 8 or 9;
6. Fam(d, a) ∧ ∀x (x 6 ε a ∨ π1({d}(x)) > 5) if τ has first component 10, 11;
7. Set(a) ∧ e ε a ∧ f ε a if τ has first component 12.
By sake of example we present here the clauses for codes of Π-sets.
Set(〈2, 〈a, b〉〉) if Fam(b, a);
n ε 〈2, 〈a, b〉〉 if
Fam(b, a) ∧ ∀x (x 6 ε a ∨ {n}(x) ε {b}(x)) ∧ ∀x∀y (x 6≡a y ∨ {n}(x) ≡{b}(x) {n}(y));
n 6 ε 〈2, 〈a, b〉〉 if
Fam(b, a) ∧ (∃x (x ε a ∧ {n}(x) 6 ε {b}(x)) ∨ ∃x∃y (x ≡a y ∧ {n}(x) 6≡{b}(x) {n}(y)));
n ≡〈2,〈a,b〉〉 m if
Fam(b, a) ∧ n ε 〈2, 〈a, b〉〉 ∧ mε 〈2, 〈a, b〉〉 ∧ ∀x (x 6 ε a ∨ {n}(x) ≡{b}(x) {m}(x));
n 6≡〈2,〈a,b〉〉 m if
Fam(b, a) ∧ (n 6 ε 〈2, 〈a, b〉〉 ∨ m 6 ε 〈2, 〈a, b〉〉 ∨ ∃x (x ε a ∧ {n}(x) 6≡{b}(x) {m}(x))
The formulas Set(n), tεn, t 6 ε n, t ≡n s and t 6≡n s are components of a predicate Pθ(n) defined
in ÎD1 as a fix point of an operator θ(n,X) defined by glueing together the clauses expressing the
code of each mTTs-set-constructor with its interpretation in ÎD1.
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The interpretation of collections
Here we extend the realizability relation, membership and equality in definition 3.4 in order to
interpret collections, propositions and the decoding operators.
Definition 3.5. n  φ between natural numbers and mTT-propositions and formulas nεJ (D) and
n ∼I(D) m for collections D are defined by including all clauses in definition 3.4 plus the following:
1. n  τ(p) and n εJ (τ(p)) are both given by n ε I(p)
n ∼I(τ(p)) m is n εJ (τ(p)) ∧mεJ (τ(p));
2. The realizability relation n  η for propositions is completely analogous to the realizability
relation for small propositions and the interpretation of propositions is given by the class of
realizers equipped with the trivial equivalence relation;
3. Σ-collections are interpreted exactly in the same way as Σ-sets;
4. nεJ (Set) is Set(n) ∧ ∀t (t ε n ↔ ¬t 6 ε n) ∧ ∀t∀s (t ≡n s ↔ ¬t 6≡n s). This is because 6 ε and
6≡, which are defined by fix point, don’t behave necessarily as negations of ε and ≡ and hence
we need to add ∀t (t ε n↔ ¬t 6 ε n) and ∀t∀s (t ≡n s↔ ¬t 6≡n s);
The interpretation of n ∼I(Set) m is
n εJ (Set) ∧ mεJ (Set) ∧ ∀t (t ε n↔ t εm) ∧ ∀t∀s (t ≡n s↔ t ≡m s);
5. n εJ (props) is n εJ (Set) ∧ π1(n) > 5 ∧ ∀t∀s (t ε n ∧ s ε n ↔ t ≡n s) (recall that small
propositions are encoded with π1(n) > 5 and enjoy the proof-irrelevance);
The interpretation of n ∼I(props) m is n εJ (props) ∧ mεJ (props) ∧ ∀t (t ε n↔ t εm);
6. n εJ (A→ props) is ∀t∀s (t ∼I(A) s → {n}(t) ∼I(props) {n}(s))
and n ∼I(A→props) m is
n εJ (A→ props) ∧ mεJ (A→ props) ∧ ∀t (t εJ (A) → {n}(t) ∼I(props) {m}(t))
The interpretation of judgements
We now need to say how judgements are interpreted in our realizability model. First of all, if
A = (A, ≃A) and B = (B, ≃B) are definable classes of ÎD1 equipped with a definable equivalence
relation, then we denote with A
.
= B the formula ∀t∀s (t ≃A s ↔ t ≃B s).
The judgements of mTTs are interpreted as follows:
1. if type ∈ {set, col, props, prop}, the interpretation of A type is I(A)
.
= I(A);
2. if type ∈ {set, col, props, prop}, the interpretation of A = B type is I(A)
.
= I(B);
3. the judgement t ∈ A is interpreted as I(t);
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4. the judgement t = s ∈ A is interpreted as I(t) ∼I(A) I(s).
5. if type ∈ {set, col, props, prop}, the interpretation of A type [x1 ∈ A1, ..., xn ∈ An] is
∀x1∀y1...∀xn∀yn (x1 ∼I(A1) y1 ∧ ... ∧ xn ∼I(An) yn → I(A)
.
= I(A) [y1/x1, ..., yn/xn])
8
6. if type ∈ {set, col, props, prop}, the interpretation of A = B type [x1 ∈ A1, ..., xn ∈ An] is
∀x1...∀xn (x1 εJ (A1) ∧ ... ∧ xn εJ (An) → I(A)
.
= I(B))
7. the judgement t ∈ A[x1 ∈ A1, ..., xn ∈ An] is interpreted as
∀x1∀y1...∀xn∀yn (x1 ∼I(A1) y1 ∧ ... ∧ xn ∼I(An) yn → I(t) ∼I(A) I(t) [y1/x1, .., yn/xn])
8. the judgement t = s ∈ A[x1 ∈ A1, ...., xn ∈ An] is interpreted as
∀x1...∀xn (x1 εJ (A1) ∧ ... ∧ xn εJ (An) → I(t) ∼I(A) I(s))
3.3 The validity theorem
A judgement J in the language ofmTTs is validated by the realizability model (R  J) if ÎD1 ⊢ I(J),
where I(J) is the interpretation of J according to the previous section. We say that a proposition φ
is validated by the model (R  φ), if its interpretation can be proven to be inhabited, which means
that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∃r(rεJ (φ)) which is equivalent to ÎD1 ⊢ ∃r(r  φ).
In order to prove how substitution is interpreted in a easy way, it is convenient to modify the
presentation of mTTs-rules, into an equivalent system (still denoted by mTTs), where we supply
the information that the members in a type equality judgement are types, and members of term
equality judgements are typed terms as follows with the warning of avoiding repetitions of same
judgements: for type ∈ {set, col, props, prop}
any rule
J1...Jn
A = B type [Γ]
is changed to
J1...Jn, A type [Γ] , B type [Γ]
A = B type [Γ]
any rule
J1...Jn
b ∈ B [Γ]
is changed to
J1...Jn, B type [Γ]
b ∈ B [Γ]
any rule
J1...Jn
a = b ∈ A [Γ]
is changed to
J1...Jn, a ∈ A type [Γ] , b ∈ A type [Γ]
a = b ∈ A type [Γ]
the substitution rule subT) and sub) in [10] are changed to
subTm)
C(x1, . . . , xn) type [x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1) ]
a1 ∈ A1, . . . , an ∈ An(a1, . . . , an−1) b1 ∈ A1, . . . , bn ∈ An(b1, . . . , bn−1)
a1 = b1 ∈ A1 . . . an = bn ∈ An(a1, . . . , an−1)
C(a1, . . . , an) = C(b1, . . . , bn) type
8Note that this definition and the following exploit the fact that mTT-variables are interpreted as themselves
thought of as ÎD1-variables.
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subm)
c(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C(x1, . . . , xn) [x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1) ]
C(x1, . . . , xn) type [x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1) ]
a1 ∈ A1, . . . , an ∈ An(a1, . . . , an−1) b1 ∈ A1, . . . , bn ∈ An(b1, . . . , bn−1)
a1 = b1 ∈ A1 . . . an = bn ∈ An(a1, . . . , an−1)
c(a1, . . . , an) = c(b1, . . . , bn) ∈ C(a1, . . . , an)
the formation rules F-Σ), F-∃) and F-∀) are changed to
F-Σ)
B col
C(x) col [x ∈ B]
Σx∈BC(x) col
F-∃)
B col
C(x) prop [x ∈ B]
∃x∈BC(x) prop
F-∀)
B col
C(x) prop [x ∈ B]
∀x∈BC(x) prop
the elimination rules E-Π) and E-∀) are changed to
E-Πm)
C(x) set [x ∈ B] C(b) set
b ∈ B f ∈ Πx∈BC(x)
Ap(f, b) ∈ C(b)
E-∀m)
C(x) prop [x ∈ B] C(b) prop
b ∈ B f ∈ ∀x∈BC(x)
Ap∀(f, b) ∈ C(b)
Note that each mTTs-type is a collection and therefore in deriving a typed term b ∈ B under
a context the addition of the information that the type B is a collection in the premise is certainly
valid.
Theorem 3.1 (Validity theorem). For every judgement J in the language of mTTs , if J can be
proven in mTTs (mTTs ⊢ J), then J is validated by the model (R  J).
Proof.
In order to prove the validity theorem it is necessary to prove by induction on the height of the
proof tree in mTTs these three facts at the same time:
1. for every judgement J in the language of mTTs, if mTTs ⊢ J then R  J ;
2. (substitution) If mTTs ⊢ C type [x1 ∈ A1, ..., xn ∈ An] for type ∈ {set, col, props, prop} for all
mTTs ⊢ a1 ∈ A1[y1 ∈ B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm], ...,
mTTs ⊢ an ∈ An[a1/x1, ..., an−1/xn−1][y1 ∈ B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm],
if R  a1 ∈ A1[y1 ∈ B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm],...,
R  an ∈ An[a1/x1, ..., an−1/xn−1][y1 ∈ B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm],
then
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀y1...∀ym (y1 εJ (B1) ∧ ... ∧ ym εJ (Bm) →
I(C) [I(a1)/x1, ..., I(an)/xn]
.
= I(C [a1/x1, ..., an/xn])
and if mTTs ⊢ c ∈ C[x1 ∈ A1, ..., xn ∈ An] for all
mTTs ⊢ a1 ∈ A1[y1 ∈ B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm], ...,
mTTs ⊢ an ∈ An[a1/x1, ..., an−1/xn−1][y1 ∈ B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm],
if R  a1 ∈ A1[y1 ∈ B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm],...,
R  an ∈ An[a1/x1, ..., an−1/xn−1][y1 ∈ B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm],
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then
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀y1...∀ym (y1 εJ (B1) ∧ ... ∧ ym εJ (Bm) →
I(c) [I(a1)/x1, ..., I(an)/xn] ∼I(C [a1/x1,...,an/xn]) I(c [a1/x1, ..., an/xn]).
3. (coding) If mTTs ⊢ B set [x1 ∈ A1, ...,n ∈ An], then
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x1...∀xn (x1 εJ (A1) ∧ ... ∧ xn εJ (An) → Set(I(Bˆ))∧
∀t (t εJ (B)↔ t εI(Bˆ)) ∧ ∀t (¬t εJ (B)↔ t 6 ε I(Bˆ))∧
∀t∀s (t ∼I(B) s↔ t ≡I(Bˆ) s) ∧ ∀t∀s (¬t ∼I(B) s↔ t 6≡I(Bˆ) s)).
We will prove the statements in the case in which [x1 ∈ A1, ..., xn ∈ An] is [x ∈ A] and [y1 ∈
B1, ..., ym ∈ Bm] is [ ], as the more general case is analogous. The choice of the empty context for the
terms which will be used in substitutions doesn’t give any loss of generality, as terms are interpreted
as terms, variables as itselves and so everything remains true up to universal closure.
The empty set
Empty set Formation
As ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(⊥ ↔ ⊥)), then we obtain that R  N0 set [x ∈ A].
Empty set elimination
Suppose we derived in mTTs the judgment emp0(a) ∈ A[a/x] by elimination after having derived
a ∈ N0 and Aset [x ∈ N0]. By inductive hypothesis on validity ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (N0), which means
that ÎD1 ⊢ ⊥, from which, by ex falso quodlibet, one can prove in ÎD1 the interpretation of the
judgment emp0(a) ∈ A[a/x].
Substitution for empty set elimination
The substitution for elimination is trivial as emp0(t) is always interpreted as a constant.
The singleton set
Singleton formation
As ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t = s ∧ t = 0 ↔ t = s ∧ t = 0)), we can conclude that
R  N1 set [x ∈ A].
Singleton introduction
Let us prove the validity of the judgment ⋆ ∈ N1[x ∈ A]. Its interpretation is
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → 0 ∼I(N1) 0)
which is by definition
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → 0 = 0)
which trivially holds in ÎD1. The substitution holds trivially, because ⋆ does not contain any variable.
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Substitution for singleton introduction
Substitution is trivial as I(⋆) and ⋆ don’t contain variables.
Singleton elimination
Suppose we derived in mTTs the judgment ElN1(t, c) ∈ C[t/y][x ∈ A] by elimination after having
derived t ∈ N1[x ∈ A], c ∈ C[⋆/y][x ∈ A] and C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ N1]. By inductive hypothesis on
validity we have that in ÎD1
(∗)∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(t) = 0)
Using (∗) and the inductive hypothesis on substitution applied to C with respect to
x ∈ A[x ∈ A] and t ∈ N1[x ∈ A] (namely, that ∀x(xεJ (A) → I(C[t/y]) = I(C)[I(t)/y])) we can
derive in ÎD1 that
(∗∗)∀x(xεJ (A)→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C)[0/y] s↔ t ∼I(C[t/y]) s))
and using the inductive hypothesis on substitution applied to C with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A] and
⋆ ∈ N1[x ∈ A], we have that
(∗ ∗ ∗)∀x(xεJ (A)→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C)[0/y] s↔ t ∼I(C[⋆/y]) s)).
Using the inductive hypothesis on validity for c we obtain that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(a) x
′ → I(c) ∼I(C[⋆/y]) I(c)[x
′/x])
and using (∗∗) and (∗) we obtain that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(a) x
′ → I(c) ∼I(C[t/y]) I(c)[x
′/x])
which is exactly
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(a) x
′ → I(ElN1(t, c)) ∼I(C[⋆/y]) I(ElN1(t, c))[x
′/x])
So we have that R  ElN1(t, c) ∈ C[t/y][x ∈ A].
Substitution for singleton elimination
In addition to the hypothesis of the previous point suppose that mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and
ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). By inductive hypothesis on substitution for c and t with respect to a we have in
ÎD1 that
(∗) I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[⋆/y][a/x]) I(c[a/x])
(∗∗) I(t)[I(a)/x] ∼I(N1) I(t[a/x])
In particular from (∗∗) we obtain that I(t[a/x]) = 0 in ÎD1. Using in (∗) the inductive hypothesis
on substitution for C with respect to ⋆ ∈ N1 and a ∈ A, and recalling that I(t[a/x]) = 0, we have
that
I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C)[I(a)/x,0/y] I(c[a/x])
which is
I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C)[I(a)/x,I(t[a/x])/y] I(c[a/x]).
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Now observing that mTTs ⊢ t[a/x] ∈ N1, and hence by inductive hypothesis
R  t[a/x] ∈ N1, as ÎD1 ⊢ I(t[a/x]) = 0, we have (using substitution for C with respect to a ∈ A
and t[a/x] ∈ N1) that
I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[a/x,t[a/x]/y]) I(c[a/x])
which exactly is
I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[t/y][a/x]) I(c[a/x])
and this is
I(ElN1(t, c))[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[t/y][a/x]) I(ElN1(t, c)[a/x]).
Singleton conversion
Suppose we derived inmTTs the judgment ElN1(⋆, c) = c[x ∈ A] by conversion after having derived
the judgments c ∈ C[⋆/y][x ∈ A] and C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ N1]. Then by inductive hypothesis on validity
we have that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(c) ∼I(C[⋆/y]) I(c)),
by the reflexivity of ∼I(A); this is exactly equivalent to
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(ElN1(⋆, c)) ∼I(C[⋆/y]) I(c)).
So R  ElN1(⋆, c) = c ∈ C[⋆/y][x ∈ A].
The set of natural numbers
Natural numbers formation
Formation is trivial as I(N) does not depend on any variable.
Natural numbers introduction
Let us check that R  0 ∈ N [x ∈ A]. This is trivial as in ÎD1, we have that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → 0 = 0).
Suppose now we derived in mTTs the judgment succ(n) ∈ N [x ∈ A] by introduction after having
derived n ∈ N [x ∈ A]. By using the inductive hypothesis on validity we deduce similarly that
R  succ(n) ∈ N [x ∈ A].
Substitution for natural numbers introduction
The case of substitution for 0 is trivial as 0 does not contain variables. Suppose in addition to the
hypothesis in the previous point thatmTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and this is valid in R. By inductive hypothesis
on substitution we have that
ÎD1 ⊢ I(n)[I(a)/x] = I(n[a/x])
from which we derive
ÎD1 ⊢ succ(I(n)[I(a)/x]) = succ(I(n[a/x]))
which is exactly
ÎD1 ⊢ I(succ(n))[I(a)/x] = I(succ(n)[a/x]).
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Natural numbers elimination
Suppose we derived ElN(n, a, (y, z)b) ∈ B[n/u][x ∈ A] in mTT
s by elimination after having derived
1. B set [x ∈ A, u ∈ N ],
2. a ∈ B[0/u][x ∈ A],
3. n ∈ N [x ∈ A],
4. b ∈ B[succ(y)/u][x ∈ A, y ∈ N, z ∈ B[y/u]].
Using the inductive hypotheses we will first prove that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ →
∀u({rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), u) ∼I(B) {rec}(I(a)[x
′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x], u))).
We suppose x ∼I(A) x
′ and we prove this by induction on u. First of all by inductive hypothesis on
validity for a we have that
I(a) ∼I(B[0/u]) I(a)[x
′/x]
which by definition is
{rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), 0) ∼I(B[0/u]) {rec}(I(a)[x
′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x], 0).
Using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for B with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A] and 0 ∈ N [x ∈ A]
we obtain that
{rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), 0) ∼I(B)[0/u] {rec}(I(a)[x
′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x]).
Suppose now that
{rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), u) ∼I(B) {rec}(I(a)[x
′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x], u)
By inductive hypothesis on validity for b we have that
I(b)[u/y, {rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), u)/z] ∼I(B[succ(y)/u])[u/y,{rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b),u)/z]
I(b)[x′/x, u/y, {rec}(I(a)[x′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x], u)/z].
Using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for B with respect to
x ∈ A[x ∈ A, y ∈ N, z ∈ B[y/u]] and succ(y) ∈ N [x ∈ A, y ∈ N ] and the inductive hypothesis on
substitution for B with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A, y ∈ N ] and y ∈ N [x ∈ A, y ∈ N ] we obtain that
I(b)[u/y, {rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), u)/z] ∼I(B)[succ(u)/u]
I(b)[x′/x, u/y, {rec}(I(a)[x′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x], u)/z]
which is by definition
{rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), u+ 1) ∼I(B)[succ(u)/u] {rec}(I(a)[x
′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x], u+ 1).
So we can conclude that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ →
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∀u({rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), u) ∼I(B) {rec}(I(a)[x
′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x], u))).
Now considering that by inductive hypothesis on validity we have that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(n) = I(n)[x′/x])
we obtain that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → {rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), I(n)) ∼I(B)[I(n)/u]
{rec}(I(a)[x′/x],Λy.Λz.I(b)[x′/x], I(n)[x′/x]))
which is by definition
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(ElN (n, a, (y, z)b)) ∼I(B)[I(n)/u] I(ElN (n, a, (y, z)b))[x
′/x]).
Now using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for B with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A] and n ∈
N [x ∈ A] we have that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(ElN (n, a, (y, z)b)) ∼I(B[n/u]) I(ElN (n, a, (y, z)b))[x
′/x])
which means that R  ElN (n, a, (y, z)b) ∈ B[n/u].
Substitution for natural numbers elimination
We add to the hypotheses of the previous point, the hypothesis that a¯ ∈ A is provable in mTTs and
valid in R. By inductive hypothesis on substitution we have in ÎD1 that I(n)[I(a¯)/x] = I(n[a¯/x]).
We must prove by induction on u that
∀u({rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), u)[I(a¯)/x] ∼I(B[a¯/x]) {rec}(I(a[a¯/x]),Λy.Λz.I(b[a¯/x]), u)).
We prove this statement in a way similar to that of the previous point, using the inductive hypotheses
on substitution. From this we derive that
{rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), I(n))[I(a¯)/x] ∼I(B[a¯/x])[I(n[a¯/x])/u]
{rec}(I(a[a¯/x]),Λy.Λz.I(b[a¯/x]), I(n[a¯/x])).
Using the inductive hypothesis on substitution applied to a¯ ∈ A[u ∈ N ] and u ∈ N [u ∈ N ] we obtain
that
{rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), I(n))[I(a¯)/x] ∼I(B)[I(a¯)/x,I(n[a¯/x])/u]
{rec}(I(a[a¯/x]),Λy.Λz.I(b[a¯/x]), I(n[a¯/x])).
So we have in ÎD1, using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for B with respect to a¯ ∈ A and
n[a¯/x] ∈ N , that
{rec}(I(a),Λy.Λz.I(b), I(n))[I(a¯)/x] ∼I(B[a¯/x,n[a¯/x]/y])/u]
{rec}(I(a[a¯/x]),Λy.Λz.I(b[a¯/x]), I(n[a¯/x])).
This is equivalent to say that
I(ElN (n, a, (y, z)b))[I(a¯)/x] ∼I(B[n/y][a¯/x])/u] I(ElN (n, a, (y, z)b)[a¯/x]).
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Natural numbers conversion
For conversion suppose that we derived ElN (0, a, (y, z)b) = a ∈ B[0/u][x ∈ A] in mTT
s by conver-
sion after having derived
1. B set [x ∈ A, u ∈ N ],
2. a ∈ B[0/u][x ∈ A],
3. b ∈ B[succ(y)/u][x ∈ A, y ∈ N, z ∈ B[y/u]].
By inductive hypothesis on validity we have that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(a) ∼I(B[0/y]) I(a))
which by definition is
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(ElN (0, a, (y, z)b)) ∼I(B[0/y]) I(a)).
Suppose we derived ElN (succ(n), a, (y, z)b) ∈ B[succ(n)/u][x ∈ A] in mTT
s by conversion after
having derived the previous judgments and n ∈ N [x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on substitution
applied to b with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A], n ∈ N [x ∈ A] and
ElN (n, a, (y, z)b) ∈ B[n/u][x ∈ A] we have that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(b)[I(n)/y, I(ElN (n, a, (y, z)b))/z] ∼I(B[succ(n)/y]) I(b[n/y,ElN(n, a, (y, z)b)/z]))
which is exactly
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(ElN (succ(n), a, (y, z)b)) ∼I(B[succ(n)/y]) I(b[n/y,ElN(n, a, (y, z)b)/z]))
Dependent products
Dependent product formation
Suppose that R  C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] and R  B set [x ∈ A], then
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′∀y∀y′(x ∼I(A) x
′ ∧ y ∼I(B) y
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C) s↔ t ∼I(C)[x′/x,y′/y] s))
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(B)[x′/x] s))
From x ∼I (A)x
′ we can also deduce in ÎD1 that
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → {t}(y) ∼I(C) {t}(y
′))↔ ∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B)[x′/x] y
′ → {t}(y) ∼I(C)[x′/x] {t}(y
′))
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → {s}(y) ∼I(C) {s}(y
′))↔ ∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B)[x′/x] y
′ → {s}(y) ∼I(C)[x′/x] {s}(y
′))
∀y(yεJ (B)→ {t}(y) ∼I(C) {s}(y))↔ ∀y(yεJ (B)[x
′/x]→ {t}(y) ∼I(C)[x′/x] {s}(y))
which means that ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I((Πy∈B)C) s↔ t ∼I((Πy∈B)C)[x′/x] s)) that is
R  (Πy ∈ B)C set [x ∈ A].
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Substitution for dependent product formation
In addition to the hypotheses thatmTTs ⊢ B set [x ∈ A] andmTTs ⊢ C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ B], suppose
that mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). Then by inductive hypothesis on substitution for B
with respect to a and for C with respect to a ∈ A[y ∈ B[a/x]] and y ∈ B[a/x][y ∈ B[a/x]] we have
that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] s↔ t ∼I(B[a/x]) s)
and
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀y(yεJ (B[a/x])→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C)[I(a)/x] s↔ t ∼I(C[a/x]) s).
We can deduce in ÎD1 that for every t and s
t ∼I(Πy∈B)C[I(a)/x] s
is equivalent to
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] y
′ → {t}(y) ∼I(C)[I(a)/x] {t}(y
′))∧
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] y
′ → {s}(y) ∼I(C)[I(a)/x] {s}(y
′))∧
∀y(yεJ (B)[I(a)/x] → {t}(y) ∼I(C)[I(a)/x] {s}(y))
which is equivalent to
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B[a/x]) y
′ → {t}(y) ∼I(C[a/x]) {t}(y
′))∧
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B[a/x]) y
′ → {s}(y) ∼I(C[a/x]) {s}(y
′))∧
∀y(yεJ (B[a/x])→ {t}(y) ∼I(C[a/x]) {s}(y))
which is exactly t ∼I((Πy∈B)C)[a/x] s.
Dependent product introduction
Suppose we obtained mTTs ⊢ (λy)c ∈ (Πy ∈ B)C by introduction after having proved
mTTs ⊢ c ∈ C[x ∈ A, y ∈ B], mTTs ⊢ C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] and
mTTs ⊢ B set [x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on validity we have that
∀x∀x′∀y∀y′(x ∼I(A) x
′ ∧ y ∼I(B) y
′ → I(c) ∼I(C) I(c)[x
′/x, y′/y])
which is equivalent to
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → {Λy.I(c)}(y) ∼I(C) {Λy.I(c)[x
′/x]}(y′)))
which is equivalent to
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → {I((λy)c)}(y) ∼I(C) {I((λy)c)[x
′/x]}(y′)))
From this it follows that
1. x ∼I(A) x implies that ∀y∀y
′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → {I((λy)c)}(y) ∼I(C) {I(λy.c)}(y
′)), which means
that I((λy)c)εI((Πy ∈ B)C);
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2. x′ ∼I(A) x
′ implies that
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → {I((λy)c)[x′/x]}(y) ∼I(C)[x′/x] {I((λy)c[x
′/x]}(y′)),
which means that I((λy)c)[x′/x]εI((Πy ∈ B)C);
3. using the fact that yεJ (B) entails y ∼I(B) y we have that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀y(yεJ (B)→ {I((λy)c)}(y) ∼I(C) {I((λy)c)[x
′/x]}(y)).
This gives us that R  (λy)c ∈ (Πy ∈ B)C[x ∈ A].
Substitution for dependent product introduction
For substitution in addition to the hypotheses of the previous point, suppose that
1. mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and
2. ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A).
From this by inductive hypothesis on substitution with respect to a ∈ A [y ∈ B[a/x]] and
y ∈ B[a/x] [y ∈ B[a/x]] we obtain that
∀y(yεJ (B[a/x])→ I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[a/x]) I(c[a/x]))
which entails that
∀y(yεJ (B[a/x])→ {I(λy.c)[I(a)/x]}(y) ∼I(C[a/x])) {I((λy)c[a/x])}(y))
Moreover by the inductive hypothesis on validity for c and the validity hypothesis for aεA, we obtain
that
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] y
′ → {I(λy.c)[I(a)/x]}(y) ∼I(C)[I(a)/x] {I(λy.c)[I(a)/x]}(y
′))
and using the substitution hypothesis for B and C we obtain that
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B[a/x]) y
′ → {I(λy.c)[I(a)/x]}(y) ∼I(C[a/x]) {I(λy.c)[I(a)/x]}(y
′)).
By using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for c, for C, the validity hypothesis on c ∈ C[x ∈
A, y ∈ B] and the previous one we obtain also that
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B[a/x]) y
′ → {I(λy.c[a/x])}(y) ∼I(C[a/x]) {I(λy.c[a/x])}(y
′)).
This entails that
ÎD1 ⊢ I((λy)c)[I(a)/x] ∼I((Πy∈B)C[a/x]) I((λy)c[a/x]).
Dependent product elimination
Suppose we derived in mTTs, the judgment Ap(f, b) ∈ C[b/y][x ∈ A] by elimination after having
derived in mTTs the judgments b ∈ B[x ∈ A] and f ∈ (Πy ∈ B)C[x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis
on validity we have that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(b) ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x])
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∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ →
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → {I(f)}(y) ∼I(C) {I(f)}(y
′))∧
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → {I(f)[x′/x]}(y) ∼I(C) {I(f)[x
′/x]}(y′))∧
∀y(yεJ (B)→ {I(f)}(y) ∼I(C) {I(f)[x
′/x]}(y))).
From these we can easily deduce that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → {I(f)}(I(b)) ∼I(B) {I(f)[x
′/x]}(I(b)[x′/x])).
This is exactly
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(Ap(f, b)) ∼I(C)[I(b)/y] I(Ap(f, b))[x
′/x]).
Now, applying the inductive hypothesis on substitution for C with respect to b ∈ B[x ∈ A] and
x ∈ A[x ∈ A], we obtain that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(Ap(f, b)) ∼I(C[b/y]) I(Ap(f, b))[x
′/x]).
So in particular we have that
R  Ap(f, b) ∈ C[b/y][x ∈ A].
Substitution for dependent product elimination
In addition to the hypotheses of the previous point, we add the hypotheses that
mTT ⊢ a ∈ A and ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). By inductive hypothesis on substitution we have in ÎD1 that
I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(B[a/x]) I(b[a/x])
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B[a/x]) y
′ → {I(f)[I(a)/x]}(y) ∼I(C[a/x]) {I(f)[I(a)/x]}(y
′))∧
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B[a/x]) y
′ → {I(f [a/x])}(y) ∼I(C[a/x]) {I(f [a/x])}(y
′))∧
∀y(yεJ (B[a/x])→ {I(f)[I(a)/x]}(y) ∼I(C[a/x]) {I(f [a/x])}(y))).
From this we can deduce in ÎD1 that
{I(f)[I(a)/x]}(I(b)[I(a)/x]) ∼I(C[a/x]) {I(f [a/x])}(I(b[a/x]))
which is
I(Ap(f, b))[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[a/x]) I(Ap(f, b)[a/x])
Dependent product conversion
Suppose we derived in mTTs the judgment Ap(λy.c, b) = c[b/y][x ∈ A] by conversion after having
derived mTTs ⊢ c ∈ C[x ∈ A, y ∈ B] and mTTs ⊢ b ∈ B[x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on
validity we can suppose that these two judgments are validated by R and we can use the inductive
hypothesis on substitution applied to c with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A] and b ∈ B[x ∈ A], obtaining
that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(c)[I(b)/y] ∼I(C[b/y]) I(c[b/y]))
which is exactly
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(Ap(λy.c, b)) ∼I(C[b/y]) I(c[b/y])).
So we have that R  Ap(λy.c, b) = c[b/y][x ∈ A].
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Dependent sum sets
Dependent sum formation
Suppose that R  C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] and R  B set [x ∈ A], then
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′∀y∀y′(x ∼I(A) x
′ ∧ y ∼I(B) y
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C) s↔ t ∼I(C)[x′/x,y′/y] s))
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(B)[x′/x] s))
From x ∼I(A) x
′, we can also deduce in ÎD1 that
p1(t) ∼I(B) p1(s) ∧ ∀y(y ∼I(B) p1(t)→ p2(t) ∼I(C) p2(s))↔
p1(t) ∼I(B)[x′/x] p1(s) ∧ ∀y(y ∼I(B)[x′/x] p1(t)→ p2(t) ∼I(C)[x′/x] p2(s))
which means that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I((Σy∈B)C) s↔ t ∼I((Σy∈B)C)[x′/x] s))
that is R  (Σy ∈ B)C set [x ∈ A].
Substitution for dependent sum formation
In addition the hypotheses that mTTs ⊢ B set [x ∈ A] and mTTs ⊢ C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ B], suppose
that mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). Then by inductive hypothesis on substitution for B
with respect to a and for C with respect to a ∈ A[y ∈ B[a/x]] and y ∈ B[a/x][y ∈ B[a/x]] we have
that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] s↔ t ∼I(B[a/x]) s)
and
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀y(yεJ (B[a/x])→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C)[I(a)/x] s↔ t ∼I(C[a/x]) s).
From these we can immediately deduce that
ÎD1 ⊢ I((Σy ∈ B)C)[I(a)/x]
.
= I((Σy ∈ B)C[a/x]),
as ∼I(Σy∈B)C only depends on I(B) and I(C).
Dependent sum introduction
Suppose we derived in mTTs, 〈b, c〉 ∈ (Σy ∈ B)C[x ∈ A] by introduction after having derived in
mTTs, b ∈ B[x ∈ A], c ∈ C[b/y][x ∈ A] and C col[x ∈ A, y ∈ B]. Suppose x ∼I(A) x
′. By inductive
hypothesis on validity applied to b ∈ B[x ∈ A], we obtain in ÎD1 that I(b) ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x] (and so
also I(b)εJ (B) and I(b)[x′/x] ∈ J (B)). By inductive hypothesis on the validity of
C col[x ∈ A, y ∈ B], if we have that y ∼I(B) I(b), we obtain that I(C)
.
= I(C)[I(b)/y]. By inductive
hypothesis on substitution applied to C col[x ∈ A, y ∈ B], b ∈ B[x ∈ A] and x ∈ A[x ∈ A], we have
that I(C)[I(b)/y]
.
= I(C[b/y]). Now by inductive hypothesis on validity on c ∈ C[b/y][x ∈ A]
we have I(c) ∼I(C[b/y]) I(c)[x
′/x]. From this and the previous remarks we derive that I(c) ∼I(C)
I(c)[x′/x] (and so moreover I(c)εJ (C) and I(c)[x′/x]εJ (C)).
Moreover, by what we said before, y ∼I(B) I(b) is equivalent to y ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x].
This means that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ →
I(b) ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x] ∧ ∀y(y ∼I(B) I(b)→ I(c) ∼I(C) I(c)[x
′/x])).
This exactly means that R  〈b, c〉 ∈ (Σy ∈ B)C[x ∈ A].
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Substitution for dependent sum introduction
For substitution, under the same hypothesis, suppose that
1. mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and
2. ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A).
By the rules of mTTs, we know also that mTTs ⊢ C[b/y] col [x ∈ A] and
mTTs ⊢ B col [x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on substitution of a in b, we have that
I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(B[a/x]) I(b[a/x]).
By inductive hypothesis on substitutions of a in C[b/y], of b[x ∈ A] and x ∈ A[x ∈ A] in C, of
a ∈ A[y ∈ B[a/x]] and y ∈ B[a/x][y ∈ B[a/x]] in C we obtain that
(∗) I(C[b/y][a/x])
.
= I(C[b/y])[I(a)/x]
.
= I(C)[I(b)/y][I(a)/x]
.
=
I(C)[I(a)/x][I(b)[I(a)/x]/y]
.
= I(C[a/x])[I(b)[I(a)/x]/y].
Suppose that y ∼I(B[a/x]) I(b)[I(a)/x]. By inductive hypothesis on substitution for c,
I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[b/y][a/x]) I(c[a/x]).
By the inductive hypothesis on substitution
I(B)[I(a)/x]
.
= I(B[a/x])
(and so y ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] I(b)[I(a)/x]), and using the inductive hypothesis on validity for C set we
obtain that I(C)[I(a)/x, I(b)[I(a)/x]/y]
.
= I(C)[I(a)/x] and so using (∗) we derive that
I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C)[a/x]) I(c[a/x])
after having noticed that I(C[a/x])
.
= I(C)[I(a)/x] by using the inductive hypothesis on substitu-
tion for C with respect to a ∈ A[y ∈ B[a/x]] and y ∈ B[a/x][y ∈ B[a/x]]. So we obtained what we
needed.
Dependent sum elimination
Suppose we deduced ElΣ(d, (y, z)e) ∈ E[d/u][x ∈ A] in mTT
s, after having derived
1. E set [x ∈ A, u ∈ (Σy ∈ B)C],
2. d ∈ (Σy ∈ B)C[x ∈ A],
3. e ∈ E[〈y, z〉][x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C] and so also
4. B set [x ∈ A],
5. C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] by the structure of the rules of mTTs.
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By inductive hypothesis on validity we can suppose that all these judgments are valid in R. In
particular we have that R  d ∈ (Σy ∈ B)C[x ∈ A]. This in particular implies that in ÎD1
(∗)∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ →
(p1(I(d)) ∼I(B) p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) ∧ p2(I(d)) ∼I(C)[p1(I(d))/y] p2(I(d)[x
′/x]))).
Moreover we have that R  e ∈ E[〈y, z〉][x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C]. This in particular implies that in
ÎD1
(∗∗)∀x∀x′∀y∀y′∀z∀z′(x ∼I(A) x
′ ∧ y ∼I(B) y
′ ∧ z ∼I(C) z
′ →
I(e) ∼I(E[〈y,z〉/u]) I(e)[x
′/x, y′/y, z′/z]).
Putting together (∗) and (∗∗) we obtain that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ →
I(e)[p1(I(d))/y, p2(I(d))/z] ∼I(E[〈y,z〉/u])[p1(I(d))/y,p2(I(d))/z]
I(e)[x′/x, p1(I(d)[x
′/x])/y, p2(I(d)[x
′/x])/z])
and this exactly means that
(∗ ∗ ∗)∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ →
I(ElΣ(d, (y, z)e)) ∼I(E[〈y,z〉/u])[p1(I(d))/y,p2(I(d))/z] I(ElΣ(d, (y, z)e))[x
′/x]).
Now it is immediate to see that
mTTs ⊢ 〈y, z〉 ∈ (Σy ∈ B)C[x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C]
mTTs ⊢ x ∈ A[x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C]
and these judgments are validated by R, as C set [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] is valid in R. In particular, by the
inductive hypothesis on substitution applied to E we have that
∀x∀y∀z(x ∈ J (A) ∧ y ∈ J (B) ∧ z ∈ J (C)→ I(E)[〈y, z〉/u]
.
= I(E[〈y, z〉/u])).
Using (∗) we immediately obtain, from the previous, that
∀x(x ∈ J (A)→ I(E)[I(d)/u]
.
= I(E[〈y, z〉/u])[p1(I(d))/y, p2(I(d))/z]).
Moreover as we have that
mTTs ⊢ d ∈ (Σy ∈ B)C[x ∈ A]
mTTs ⊢ x ∈ A[x ∈ A]
and both these judgments are valid in R (the first by inductive hypothesis), we also have that
∀x(x ∈ J (A)→ I(E)[I(d)/u]
.
= I(E[d/u]))
which combined with what we proved before gives us that
∀x(x ∈ J (A)→ I(E[d/u])
.
= I(E[〈y, z〉/u])[p1(I(d))/y, p2(I(d))/z]).
Recalling (∗ ∗ ∗) we can conclude that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(ElΣ(d, (y, z)e)) ∼I(E[d/u]) I(ElΣ(d, (y, z)e))[x
′/x])
which exactly means that
R  ElΣ(d, (y, z)e) ∈ E[d/u][x ∈ A].
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Substitution for dependent sum elimination
Under the same hypothesis as in the previous point suppose we have mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and
ÎD1 ⊢ I(a) ∈ J (A). First of all by inductive hypothesis on substitution applied to d we can derive
that in mTTs
(i) p1(I(d)[I(a)/x]) ∼I(B[a/x]) p1(I(d[a/x]))∧
p2(I(d)[I(a)/x]) ∼I(C[a/x])[p1(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y] p2(I(d[a/x])).
Using inductive hypothesis on substitution for B and C this is equivalent to
p1(I(d)[I(a)/x]) ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] p1(I(d[a/x]))∧
p2(I(d)[I(a)/x]) ∼I(C)[I(a)/x,p1(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y] p2(I(d[a/x])).
Using (∗∗) from the previous section we obtain that
(ii) I(e)[I(a)/x, p1(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y, p2(I(d)[I(a)/x])/z] ∼I(E[〈y,z〉])[I(a)/x,p1(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y,p2(I(d)[I(a)/x])/z]
I(e)[I(a)/x, p1(I(d[a/x]))/y, p2(I(d[a/x]))/z].
Now we can easily see that the following judgments are derivable in mTTs and valid in R:
a ∈ A[y ∈ B[a/x], z ∈ C[a/x]]
y ∈ B[a/x][y ∈ B[a/x], z ∈ C[a/x]]
z ∈ C[a/x][y ∈ B[a/x], z ∈ C[a/x]],
so by inductive hypothesis on substitution applied to e we have that
∀y∀z(yεJ (B[a/x]) ∧ zεJ (C[a/x])→ I(e)[I(a)/x] ∼I(E[〈y,z〉/u][a/x]) I(e[a/x])).
By using (i) we obtain that in ÎD1
(iii) I(e)[I(a)/x][p1(I(d[a/x]))/y, p2(I(d[a/x]))/z] ∼I(E[〈y,z〉/u][a/x])[p1(I(d[a/x]))/y,p2(I(d[a/x]))/z]
I(e[a/x]))[p1(I(d[a/x]))/y, p2(I(d[a/x]))/z].
Combining (ii) and (iii) and using the inductive hypothesis on substitution applied to E in a
way similar to that of the previous subsection we obtain that
I(e)[I(a)/x, p1(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y, p2(I(d)[I(a)/x])/z] ∼I(E[d/u][a/x])
I(e[a/x]))[p1(I(d[a/x]))/y, p2(I(d[a/x]))/z]
which is exactly
I(ElΣ(d, (y, z)e))[I(a)/x] ∼I(E[d/u][a/x]) I(ElΣ(d, (y, z)e)[a/x]).
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Dependent sum conversion
Suppose we derived in mTTs the judgment ElΣ(〈b, c〉, (y, z)e) = e[b/y, c/z][x ∈ A] by conversion
after having derived
1. b ∈ B[x ∈ A],
2. c ∈ C[b/y][x ∈ A],
3. E set [x ∈ A, u ∈ (Σy ∈ B)C] and
4. e ∈ E[〈y, z〉/u][x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C].
By inductive hypothesis on validity we have that R  b ∈ B[x ∈ A] and R  c ∈ C[b/y][x ∈ A].
Moreover the judgment x ∈ A[x ∈ A] is provable in mTTs and valid in R. So we can apply the
inductive hypothesis on substitution to e obtaining that in ÎD1
∀x(x ∈ J (A)→ I(e)[I(b)/y, I(c)/z] ∼I(E[〈b,c〉/u]) I(e[b/y, c/z]))
and this is exactly
∀x(x ∈ J (A)→ I(ElΣ(〈b, c〉), (y, z)e) ∼I(E[〈b,c〉/u] I(e[b/y, c/z])).
The binary sum set
Binary sum formation
Suppose that R  B set [x ∈ A] and R  C set [x ∈ A], then
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(B)[x′/x] s));
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C) s↔ t ∼I(C)[x′/x] s)).
From x ∼I (A)x
′ we can also deduce in ÎD1 that
p1(t) = p1(s) ∧ ((p1(t) = 0 ∧ p2(t) ∼I(B) p2(s)) ∨ (p1(t) = 1 ∧ p2(t) ∼I(C) p2(s)))↔
p1(t) = p1(s) ∧ ((p1(t) = 0 ∧ p2(t) ∼I(B)[x′/x] p2(s)) ∨ (p1(t) = 1 ∧ p2(t) ∼I(C)[x′/x] p2(s)))
which means that ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B+C) s ↔ t ∼I(B+C)[x′/x] s)) that is
R  B + C set [x ∈ A].
Substitution for binary sum formation
Suppose that in mTTs we derived B+C set [x ∈ A] by formation after having derived B set [x ∈ A]
and C set [x ∈ A], and suppose that mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). Then by inductive
hypothesis on substitution for B and C with respect to a we obtain that in ÎD1
∀t∀s(t ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] s↔ t ∼I(B[a/x]) s));
∀t∀s(t ∼I(C)[I(a)/x] s↔ t ∼I(C[a/x]) s));
and from these it follows that
I(B + C)[I(a)/x]
.
= I(B + C[a/x])
as ∼I(Σy∈B)C only depends on I(B) and I(C).
37
Binary sum introduction
Suppose inl(b) ∈ B+C[x ∈ A] is derived by introduction after having derived inmTTs the judgment
b ∈ B[x ∈ A]. Then we can suppose by inductive hypothesis on validity that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(b) ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x])
from which it comes that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → p1(〈0, I(b)〉) = p1(〈0, I(b)[x
′/x]〉)∧
p1(〈0, I(b)〉) = 0 ∧ p2(〈0, I(b)〉) ∼I(B) p2(〈0, I(b)[x
′/x]〉))
which entails that R  inl(b) ∈ B + C[x ∈ A]. A similar reasoning holds for inr(c).
Substitution for binary sum introduction
For substitution, the substitutions for inl(b) or inr(c) directly come from the inductive hypothesis on
substitution for b and c respectively.
Binary sum elimination
Suppose we derived El+(d, (y)b, (y)c) ∈ C[d/z][x ∈ A] in mTT
s by elimination after having derived
1. d ∈ B + C[x ∈ A],
2. C set [x ∈ A, z ∈ B + C],
3. b ∈ C[inl(y)/z][x ∈ A, y ∈ B] and
4. x ∈ C[inr(y)/z][x ∈ A, y ∈ C].
By inductive hypothesis on validity, in ÎD1, if we assume x ∼I(A) x
′ we have that
(p1(I(d)) = p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) = 0 ∧ p2(I(d)) ∼I(B) p2(I(d)[x
′/x]))∨
(p1(I(d)) = p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) = 1 ∧ p2(I(d)) ∼I(C) p2(I(d)[x
′/x]));
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → I(b) ∼I(C[inl(y)/z]) I(b)[x
′/x, y′/y]);
∀y∀y′(y ∼I(B) y
′ → I(c) ∼I(C[inr(y)/z]) I(c)[x
′/x, y′/y]).
Using these three conditions we immediately obtain that
(p1(I(d)) = p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) = 0∧
I(b)[p2(I(d))/y] ∼I(C[inl(y)/z])[p2(I(d))/y] I(b)[x
′/x, p2(I(d)[x
′/x])/y])∨
(p1(I(d)) = p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) = 1∧
I(c)[p2(I(d))/y] ∼I(C[inr(y)/z])[p2(I(d))/y] I(c)[x
′/x, p2(I(d)[x
′/x])/y]).
Using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for C with respect to
x ∈ A[x ∈ A, y ∈ A], inl(y) ∈ B + C[x ∈ A, y ∈ B]
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and with respect to
x ∈ A[x ∈ A, y ∈ A], inl(y) ∈ B + C[x ∈ A, y ∈ B]
we obtain that
(p1(I(d)) = p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) = 0∧
I(b)[p2(I(d))/y] ∼I(C)[I(d)/u] I(b)[x
′/x, p2(I(d)[x
′/x])/y])∨
(p1(I(d)) = p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) = 1∧
I(c)[p2(I(d))/y] ∼I(C)[I(d)/u] I(c)[x
′/x, p2(I(d)[x
′/x])/y]).
Using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for C with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A] and
d ∈ B + C[x ∈ A] we obtain that
(p1(I(d)) = p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) = 0∧
I(b)[p2(I(d))/y] ∼I(C[d/u]) I(b)[x
′/x, p2(I(d)[x
′/x])/y])∨
(p1(I(d)) = p1(I(d)[x
′/x]) = 1∧
I(c)[p2(I(d))/y] ∼I(C[d/u]) I(c)[x
′/x, p2(I(d)[x
′/x])/y]).
By definition this is equivalent to
I(El+(d, (y)b, (y)c)) ∼I(C[d/u]) I(El+(d, (y)b, (y)c))[x
′/x].
This is what we needed.
Substitution for binary sum elimination
Suppose we derived El+(d, (y)b, (y)c) ∈ C[d/z][x ∈ A] in mTT
s by elimination after having derived
1. d ∈ B + C[x ∈ A],
2. C set [x ∈ A, z ∈ B + C],
3. b ∈ C[inl(y)/z][x ∈ A, y ∈ B] and
4. x ∈ C[inr(y)/z][x ∈ A, y ∈ C].
Suppose moreover that mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). Recall that by the structure of
rules in mTTs we have already derived B set [x ∈ A] and C set [x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on
substitution we have that in ÎD1:
(p1(I(d)[I(a)/x]) = p1(I(d[a/x])) = 0 ∧ p2(I(d)[I(a)/x]) ∼I(B) p2(I(d[a/x])))∨
(p1(I(d)[I(a)/x]) = p1(I(d[a/x])) = 1 ∧ p2(I(d)[I(a)/x]) ∼I(C) p2(I(d[a/x])));
I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[inl(y)/z][a/x]) I(b[a/x]);
I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[inr(y)/z][a/x]) I(c[a/x]).
Using the inductive hypothesis on validity for b and c, the inductive hypothesis on substitution for
B and C with respect a, and the previous relations we obtain that
(p1(I(d)[I(a)/x]) = p1(I(d[a/x])) = 0∧
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I(b)[I(a)/x][p2(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y] ∼I(C[inl(y)/z][I(a)/x,p2(I(d[a/x])/y]) I(b)[I(a)/x][p2(I(d[a/x]))/y]∧
I(b)[I(a)/x][p2(I(d[a/x]))/y] ∼I(C[inl(y)/u][a/u])[I(d[a/x])/y] I(b[a/x])[p2(I(d[a/x]))/y])∨
(p1(I(d)[I(a)/x]) = p1(I(d[a/x])) = 1∧
I(c)[I(a)/x][p2(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y] ∼I(C[inr(y)/z][I(a)/x,p2(I(d[a/x])/y]) I(c)[I(a)/x][p2(I(d[a/x]))/y]∧
I(c)[I(a)/x][p2(I(d[a/x]))/y] ∼I(C[inr(y)/u][a/u])[I(d[a/x])/y] I(c[a/x])[p2(I(d[a/x]))/y]).
Applying many times the inductive hypothesis on substitution for C with respect to different
terms, we obtain that
(p1(I(d)[I(a)/x]) = p1(I(d[a/x])) = 0∧
I(b)[I(a)/x][p2(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y] ∼I(C[d/u][a/x] I(b[a/x])[p2(I(d[a/x]))/y])∨
(p1(I(d)[I(a)/x]) = p1(I(d[a/x])) = 1∧
I(c)[I(a)/x][p2(I(d)[I(a)/x])/y] ∼I(C[d/u][a/u])I(c[a/x])[p2(I(d[a/x]))/y]).
Using the definition of the interpretation of El+(d, (y)b, (y)c) we can conclude.
Binary sum conversion
Suppose we derived El+(inl(e), (y)b, (y)c) = b[e/y] ∈ C[inl(e)/z][x ∈ A] in mTT
s by conversion
after having derived e ∈ B[x ∈ A], C set [x ∈ A, z ∈ B + C], b ∈ C[inl(y)/z][x ∈ A, y ∈ B] and
x ∈ C[inr(y)/z][x ∈ A, y ∈ C]. Suppose x ∈ J (A), then in ÎD1 we have that by inductive hypothesis
on substitution for b with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A] and e ∈ B[x ∈ A]
I(b)[I(e)/y] ∼I(B)[inl(e)/u] I(b[e/y])
which is exactly
I(El+(inl(e), (y)b, (y)c)) ∼I(B)[inl(e)/u] I(b[e/y])
which is what we needed. The other case is symmetric.
List sets
This case is similar to that of natural numbers but little more complicated. You must use induction
with respect to the length of lists.
Falsum propositions
Completely analogous to the case of empty set.
Conjunction propositions
Analogous to dependent sums.
Disjunction propositions
Analogous to binary sums.
Implication propositions
Analogous to dependent products.
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Universal quantification propositions
Analogous to dependent products.
Existential quantification propositions
Analogous to dependent sums.
Identity propositions
Identity formation
Suppose that R  B set [x ∈ A], R  b ∈ B[x ∈ A] and R  c ∈ B[x ∈ A], then
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(B)[x′/x] s));
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(b) ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x]);
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(c) ∼I(B) I(c)[x
′/x]).
Using the previous conditions, we can deduce in ÎD1 from x ∼I(A) x
′ that
(
t ∼I(B) I(b) ∧ I(b) ∼I(B) I(c)
)
↔
(
t ∼I(B)[x′/x] I(b)[x
′/x] ∧ I(b)[x′/x] ∼I(B)[x′/x] I(c)[x
′/x]
)
which means that ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t(tεI(Id(B, b, c)) ↔ tεI(Id(B, b, c))[x′/x])) that is
R  Id(B, b, c)[x ∈ A].
Substitution for Formation
In addition to the hypotheses in the previous point add that mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and
ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). By inductive hypothesis on substitution we have that in ÎD1
∀t∀s(t ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] s↔ t ∼I(B[a/x]) s);
I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(B[a/x]) I(b[a/x]);
I(c)[I(a)/x] ∼I(B[a/x]) I(c[a/x]).
From these we obtain that for every t, in ÎD1,
tεJ (Id(B, b, c))[I(a)/x]
is equivalent to
t ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] I(b)[I(a)/x] ∧ I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(B)[I(a)/x] I(c)[I(a)/x]
and this is equivalent to
t ∼I(B[a/x] I(b)[I(a)/x] ∧ I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(B[a/x]) I(c)[I(a)/x]
and this is equivalent to
t ∼I(B[a/x] I(b[a/x]) ∧ I(b[a/x]) ∼I(B[a/x]) I(c[a/x])
which is
tεJ (Id(B, b, c)[a/x]).
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Identity introduction
Suppose we derive id(b) ∈ Id(B, b, b)[x ∈ A] by introduction in mTTs after having derived
b ∈ B[x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on validity we have that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(b) ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x]).
This implies that in ÎD1 we have
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(b) ∼I(B) I(b) ∧ I(b)[x
′/x] ∼I(B) I(b))
which means that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(id(b))εI(Id(B, b, b)) ∧ I(id(b))[x′/x]εI(Id(B, b, b)))
which means that R  id(b) ∈ Id(B, b, b)[x ∈ A].
Substitution for identity introduction
In addition to the hypothesis in the previous point suppose that mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and
ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). By inductive hypothesis on substitution we have that
ÎD1 ⊢ I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(B[a/x]) I(b[a/x]).
This implies in particular that
I(id(b))[I(a)/x]εJ (Id(B, b, b)[a/x]) ∧ I(id(b)[a/x])εJ (Id(B, b, b)[a/x])
which is what we needed.
Identity elimination
Suppose we derived in mTTs the judgment ElId(p, (y)r)) ∈ δ[b/y, c/z][x ∈ A] by elimination after
having derived in mTTs the judgments
1. b ∈ B[x ∈ A],
2. c ∈ B[x ∈ A],
3. p ∈ Id(B, b, c)[x ∈ A],
4. δ props[x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ B],
5. δ[b/y, c/z] props[x ∈ A] and
6. r ∈ δ[y/z][x ∈ A, y ∈ B] (and so also δ[y/z] set [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] by the structure of the rules of
mTTs).
By inductive hypothesis on validity for p, a and b we have that in ÎD1
(∗)∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(p) ∼I(B) I(b) ∧ I(p)[x
′/x] ∼I(B) I(p) ∧ I(b) ∼I(B) I(c)∧
I(b) ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x] ∧ I(c) ∼I(B) I(c)[x
′/x]).
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By inductive hypothesis on validity for δ[y/z] and what we just showed we have that in ÎD1
(∗∗)∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(δ[y/z])[I(p)/y]↔ I(δ[y/z])[I(b)/y]).
By using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for δ with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A, y ∈ B] and two
copies of y ∈ B[x ∈ A, y ∈ B] we obtain that in ÎD1
(∗ ∗ ∗)∀x∀y(xεJ (A) ∧ yεJ (B)→ I(δ)[y/z]
.
= I(δ[y/z])).
Putting (∗), (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗) together we obtain that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(δ[y/z])[I(p)/y]↔ I(δ)[I(b)/y, I(b)/z]).
Using the inductive hypothesis on validity for δ and (∗) we obtain that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(δ[y/z])[I(p)/y]↔ I(δ)[I(b)/y, I(c)/z]).
Using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for δ with respect to x ∈ A[x ∈ A],
b ∈ B[x ∈ A] and c ∈ B[x ∈ A] we obtain that in ÎD1
(∗ ∗ ∗∗)∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(δ[y/z])[I(p)/y]↔ I(δ[b/y, c/z])).
Using the inductive hypothesis on validity for p and r we obtain that in ÎD1
(∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗)∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(r)[I(p)/y]εJ (δ[y/z])[I(p)/y]∧
I(r)[x′/x][I(p)[x′/x]/y]εJ (δ[y/z])[I(p)/y]).
From (∗ ∗ ∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗) we obtain that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(r)[I(p)/y]εJ (δ[b/y, c/z]) ∧ I(r)[x′/x][I(p)[x′/x]/y]εJ (δ[b/y, c/z]))
which means that in ÎD1
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(ElId(p, (y)r))εJ (δ[b/y, c/z]) ∧ I(ElId(p, (y)r)[x
′/x])εJ (δ[b/y, c/z]))
which exactly means that R  ElId(p, (y)r) ∈ δ[b/y, c/z][x ∈ A].
Substitution for identity elimination
In addition to the hypotheses of the previous point assume that mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A and
ÎD1 ⊢ I(a)εJ (A). The proof is similar to that of the previous point.
Collections of codes for small propositions and sets
We start by considering validity and the rules of the collection Set.
Universe of sets
Universe of sets formation
The formation is trivially verified.
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Universe of sets introduction
The validity of the judgments N̂0 ∈ Set, N̂1 ∈ Set and N̂ ∈ Set follows directly from the coding. It
is an immediate exercise in classical logic to show that if R  p ∈ Set and R  q ∈ Set, then also
R  p+ˆq ∈ Set and if R  p ∈ Set, then R  L̂ist(p) ∈ Set. It is also immediate, by definition,
to show that if R  p ∈ props, then R  p ∈ Set. In the case of (Σ̂x ∈ A)p and (Π̂x ∈ A)p we
must use the inductive hypothesis on coding and on validity to show (in a way analogous to that
of the proof of coding which will follow) that if mTTs ⊢ Aset and mTTs ⊢ p ∈ Set[x ∈ A], then
ÎD1 ⊢ Fam(Λx.I(p), I(Â)) and then to show R  (Σ̂x ∈ A)p ∈ Set and R  (Π̂x ∈ A)p ∈ Set. The
proof of substitution consists of an easy verification.
Universe of small propositions
The case of props is completely analogous and elimination and conversions follow from the proof-
irrelevance. Proofs of the statements for propositions are analogous to those for small propositions.
Other collections
Proofs of the statements for Σ-collections are analogous to those for Σ-sets. Proofs of the statements
for → props-collections are analogous to those for Π-sets. Substitutions can be proven by using the
inductive hypotheses.
General rules
Assumption of variable
We must show that R  xj ∈ Aj [x1 ∈ A1, ..., xn ∈ An] for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. This is obviously true as
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x1∀x
′
1...∀xn∀x
′
n(x1 ∼I(A1) x
′
1 ∧ ... ∧ xn ∼I(An) x
′
n → xj ∼I(Aj) x
′
j).
For substitution if mTTs ⊢ a1 ∈ A1,...,mTT
s ⊢ an ∈ An[a1/x1, ..., an−1/xn−1] and these judgments
are validated by R, then in particular
I(aj) ∼I(Aj[a1/x1,...,aj−1/xj−1]) I(aj)
which is exactly
I(xj)[I(a1)/x1, ..., I(an)/xn] ∼I(Aj[a1/x1,...,aj−1/xj−1]) I(xj [a1/x1, ..., an/xn]).
Reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity of type equality
Suppose that from mTTs ⊢ B type [x ∈ A] we derive by reflexivity that
mTTs ⊢ B = B type [x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on validity we have that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(B)[x′/x] s)).
Now xεJ (A) implies in ÎD1 that x ∼I(A) x. So
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x(xεJ (A)→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(B) s))
which exactly means that
R  B = B type [x ∈ A].
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Suppose now that from mTTs ⊢ B = C type [x ∈ A] we derive by symmetry
mTTs ⊢ C = B type [x ∈ A].
By inductive hypothesis on validity we have that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(xεJ (A)→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(C) s)).
This clearly entails that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(xεJ (A)→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C) s↔ t ∼I(B) s))
which exactly means that R  C = B type [x ∈ A].
Suppose now that from mTTs ⊢ B = C type [x ∈ A] and mTTs ⊢ C = D type [x ∈ A] we derive
by transitivity mTTs ⊢ B = D type [x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on validity we have that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(xεJ (A)→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(C) s)) and
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(xεJ (A)→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(C) s↔ t ∼I(D) s)).
And this clearly entails that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(xεJ (A)→ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(D) s))
which exactly means that R  B = D type [x ∈ A].
Substitution for types
We restrict to the case of one substitution.
Suppose that mTTs ⊢ D[b1/y1, c1/z1] = D[b2/y2, c2/z2] type [x ∈ A] is derived by sub− T after
having derived in mTTs the judgments
1. D type [x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C],
2. b1 ∈ B[x ∈ A],
3. b2 ∈ B[x ∈ A],
4. c1 ∈ C[b1/y][x ∈ A],
5. c2 ∈ C[b2/y][x ∈ A],
6. b1 = b2 ∈ B[x ∈ A],
7. c1 = c2 ∈ C[b1/y][x ∈ A],
8. B type[x ∈ A] and
9. C type[x ∈ A, y ∈ B].
Using the inductive hypothesis on validity and on substitution we can obtain that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(D)[I(b1)/y, I(c1)/z]
.
= I(D[b1/y, c1/z])),
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(D)[I(b2)/y, I(c2)/z]
.
= I(D[b2/y, c2/z])),
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(C)[I(b1)/y]
.
= I(C[b1/y])).
These together with the inductive hypothesis on validity for
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1. D type [x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C],
2. b1 = b2 ∈ B[x ∈ A] (which is ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(b1) ∼I(B) I(b2))),
3. c1 = c2 ∈ C[b1/y][x ∈ A] (which is ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(c1) ∼I(C[b1/y]) I(c2))),
gives us that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(D[b1/y, c1/z])
.
= I(D[b2/y, c2/z])).
Reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity of definitional equality
The rules of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity for terms preserve the validity with premisses
provable in mTTs, thanks to ??.
Substitution for terms
Suppose that mTTs ⊢ d[b1/y1, c1/z1] = d[b2/y2, c2/z2] ∈ D[b1/y1, c1/z1] [x ∈ A] is derived by sub
after having derived in mTTs the judgments d ∈ D[x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C],
D type [x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ C], b1 ∈ B[x ∈ A], b2 ∈ B[x ∈ A], c1 ∈ C[b1/y][x ∈ A],
c2 ∈ C[b2/y][x ∈ A], b1 = b2 ∈ B[x ∈ A], c1 = c2 ∈ C[b1/y][x ∈ A], B type [x ∈ A] and C type [x ∈
A, y ∈ B] . As in the case of sub− T we derive that in ÎD1
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(C)[I(b1)/y]
.
= I(C[b1/y])),
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(D[b1/y, c1/z])
.
= I(D[b2/y, c2/z])).
Now by using the inductive hypothesis on substitution for D and d we obtain that
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(D)[I(b1)/y, I(c1)/z]
.
= I(D[b1/y, c1/z])),
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(d)[I(b1)/y, I(c1)/z] ∼ I(d[b1/y, c1/z])),
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(d)[I(b2)/y, I(c2)/z] ∼ I(d[b2/y, c2/z])),
and using these and the previous together with the inductive hypothesis on validity for d, b1 = b2
and c1 = c2, we obtain that
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(d[b1/y, c1/z]) ∼I(D[b1/y,c1/z]) I(d[b2/y, c2/z])).
Rules of conversions
Suppose mTTs ⊢ b ∈ C[x ∈ A] is derived by the rule conv after having derived
mTTs ⊢ B = C[x ∈ A] and mTTs ⊢ b ∈ B[x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis we have that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(b) ∼I(B) I(b)[x
′/x]);
∀x(xεJ (A)→ I(B)
.
= I(C)).
From these it immediately follows that
∀x∀x′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → I(b) ∼I(C) I(b)[x
′/x])
which means that R  b ∈ C[x ∈ A].
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Let us now prove substitution for conv. Suppose mTTs ⊢ a ∈ A. Then by inductive hypothesis
on substitution (using the fact that we know that there are shorter proofs of B type [x ∈ A] and
C type [x ∈ A]) we have that if xεJ (A) we have that in ÎD1
I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(B[a/x]) I(b[a/x]);
I(B)[I(a)/x] ∼ I(B[a/x]);
I(C)[I(a)/x] ∼ I(C[a/x]);
and using the inductive hypothesis on validity we obtain that
I(b)[I(a)/x] ∼I(C[a/x]) I(b[a/x])
which is what we needed.
The rule of conversion immediately follows from the definition of the interpretation of judgments.
Coding condition
First of all notice that, for coding, it is sufficient to show that if mTTs ⊢ Aset, then ÎD1 ⊢ Set(Â).
In fact if basic formulas xεJ (−), ¬(xεJ (−)), x ∼I(−) y and ¬(x ∼I(−) y) are equivalent respectively
to xεI(−̂), x 6 ε I(−̂), x ≡I(−̂) y and x 6≡I(−̂) y, then (φ)
+ is equivalent to φ and φ is equivalent to
¬φ. So we must suppose thatmTTs ⊢ Aset is derived by formation from other provable judgments
and then we must prove, using the inductive hypothesis, that ÎD1 ⊢ Set(Â).
The cases N0,N1,N, A+A
′, List(A),⊥, A ∧ A′, A ∨A′, A→ A′, Id(A, a, b) are immediate.
Coding condition for dependent sums and products
Suppose that we derived (Πx ∈ A)B set or (Σx ∈ A)B set in mTTs by formation after having
derived Aset and B set [x ∈ A]. By inductive hypothesis on coding for A we have that
(∗) ÎD1 ⊢ Set(I(Â)).
By inductive hypothesis on coding for B we have also that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x(xεJ (A)→ Set(I(B̂)))
and so using classical logic we have that
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x(¬xεJ (A) ∨ Set(I(B̂)))
and using the inductive hypothesis on coding for A we have that
(∗∗) ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x(x 6 ε I(Â) ∨ Set(I(B̂))).
Now suppose that x ∼I(A) x
′, then by inductive hypothesis on validity we can deduce in ÎD1 that
∀t(tεJ (B)↔ tεJ (B)[x′/x]) ∧ ∀t∀s(t ∼I(B) s↔ t ∼I(B)[x′/x] s)
which is equivalent, by classical logic, to
∀t((¬tεJ (B) ∨ tεJ (B)[x′/x]) ∧ (¬tεJ (B)[x′/x] ∨ tεJ (B)))∧
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∀t∀s((¬t ∼I(B) s ∨ t ∼I(B)[x′/x] s) ∧ (¬t ∼I(B)[x′/x] s ∨ t ∼I(B) s))
which is equivalent by inductive hypothesis on coding to
∀t((t 6 ε I(B̂) ∨ tεI(B̂)[x′/x]) ∧ (t 6 ε I(B̂)[x′/x] ∨ tεI(B̂)))∧
∀t∀s((t 6≡I(B̂) s ∨ t ≡I(B̂)[x′/x] s) ∧ (t 6≡I(B̂)[x′/x] s ∨ t ≡I(B̂) s)).
So
ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x ∼I(A) x
′ → ∀t((t 6 ε I(B̂) ∨ tεI(B̂)[x′/x]) ∧ (t 6 ε I(B̂)[x′/x] ∨ tεI(B̂)))∧
∀t∀s((t 6≡I(B̂) s ∨ t ≡I(B̂)[x′/x] s) ∧ (t 6≡I(B̂)[x′/x] s ∨ t ≡I(B̂) s)).
By using classical logic and the inductive hypothesis on coding for A, we obtain that
(∗ ∗ ∗) ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′(x 6≡I(Â) x
′ ∨ ∀t((t 6 ε I(B̂) ∨ tεI(B̂)[x′/x]) ∧ (t 6 ε I(B̂)[x′/x] ∨ tεI(B̂)))∧
∀t∀s((t 6≡I(B̂) s ∨ t ≡I(B̂)[x′/x] s) ∧ (t 6≡I(B̂)[x′/x] s ∨ t ≡I(B̂) s)).
Combining (∗), (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗) we obtain that
ÎD1 ⊢ Fam(Λx.I(B̂), Â)
from which we deduce that
ÎD1 ⊢ Set( ̂(Πx ∈ A)B) ∧ Set( ̂(Σx ∈ A)B)
The cases of ∀ and ∃ are similar.
Consequences of the validity theorem
We discuss here about the validity in our realizability model for mTT of some principles, namely
Extensionality Equality of Functions, Axiom of Choice and formal Church Thesis.
1. Extensionality Equality of Functions can be formulated as a proposition in mTT as
follows:
(extFun) (∀f ∈ (Πx ∈ A)B) (∀g ∈ (Πx ∈ A)B)
((∀x ∈ A) Id(B,Ap(f, x),Ap(g, x))→ Id((Πx ∈ A)B, f, g))
Since the judgements f = g ∈ (Πx ∈ A)B and Ap(f, x) = Ap(g, x) ∈ B [x ∈ A] have the
same interpretation, extFun can be realized by the term Λf.Λg.Λr.0, i. e. our model realises
extFun.
2. The Axiom of Choice ACA,B is represented in mTT by the following proposition:
(ACA,B) (∀x ∈ A) (∃y ∈ B) ρ(x, y)→ (∃f ∈ (Πx ∈ A)B) (∀x ∈ A) ρ(x,Ap(f, x))
Unfortunately a realizer r for (∀x ∈ A) (∃y ∈ B) ρ(x, y) cannot be turned into a recursive
function from J (A) to J (B) respecting equivalence relations ∼I(A) and ∼I(B), as the inter-
pretation of propositions is proof-irrelevant and we can have different elements a and a′ of
J (A) which are equivalent in I(A) for which π1({r}(a)) and π1({r}(a
′)) are not equivalent in
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I(B). This problem can be avoided if A is a numerical set and in particular in the case of the
set N . In this case the natural number Λr.〈Λn.π1({r}(n)),Λn.π2({r}(n))〉 is a realizer for the
axiom of choice ACN,B. So R  ACN,B for every B.
Moreover also the axiom of unique choice AC! given by
(AC!) (∀x ∈ A) (∃!y ∈ B) ρ(x, y)→ (∃f ∈ (Πx ∈ A)B) (∀x ∈ A) ρ(x,Ap(f, x))
is validated by the model R.9 In fact if ρ(x, y) is a proposition in context [x ∈ A, y ∈ B], then
in particular ÎD1 ⊢ ∀x∀x
′∀y∀t (x ∼I(A) x
′ ∧ y εJ (B) ∧ t  ρ(x, y) → t  ρ(x′, y)). This
implies that we can easily choose a realizer for the axiom of unique choice.
3. If ϕ is a formula of first-order arithmetic HA, then we can define a proposition ϕ in mTT,
according to the following conditions:
⊥ is ⊥ ϕ ∧ ϕ′ is ϕ ∧ ϕ′ ∃xϕ is (∃x ∈ N)ϕ
t = s is Id(N, t, s) ϕ ∨ ϕ′ is ϕ ∨ ϕ′ ∀xϕ is (∀x ∈ N)ϕ
ϕ→ ϕ′ is ϕ→ ϕ′
where t and s are the translations of terms of HA in mTT (in particular primitive recursive
functions of HA are translated via ElN , succ and 0 are translated in the obvious corresponding
ones and variables are interpreted as themselves10). The language of HA can also be naturally
interpreted in ÎD1 by using the fact that each primitive recursive function can be encoded by
a numeral. If t is a term of HA we will still write t for its translation in ÎD1. The following
lemma is an immediate consequence of the definition of our realizability interpretation where
k denotes Kleene realizability in HA (see [21]):
Lemma 3.1. If t is a term of HA and ϕ is a formula of HA, then
(a) ÎD1 ⊢ I(t) = t
(b) ÎD1 ⊢ n k ϕ↔ n  ϕ.
The formal Church Thesis CT can be expressed in mTT as the following proposition
(CT) (∀x ∈ N) (∃y ∈ N) ρ(x, y)→ (∃e ∈ N) (∀x ∈ N) (∃u ∈ N) (T (e, x, u) ∧ ρ(x, U(u))
where T and U are the Kleene predicate and the primitive recursive function representing
Kleene application in HA. Note that the validity of CT can be obtained by glueing ACN,N
together with the following restricted form of Church Thesis for type-theoretic functions:
(CTλ) (∀f ∈ (Πx ∈ N)N) (∃e ∈ N) (∀x ∈ N) (∃u ∈ N) (T (e, x, u) ∧ Id(N,Ap(f, x), U(u)))
We know by general results on Kleene realizability that there exists a numeral r for which
HA ⊢ ∃u T (f, x, u)→ ({r}(f, x)  ∃u T (f, x, u)). Using this remark, the fact that {f}(x) ↓ is
9(∃!x ∈ A)P (x) is defined as (∃x ∈ A)P (x) ∧ (∀x ∈ A)(∀x′ ∈ A)(P (x) ∧ P (x′)→ Id(A, x, x′)).
10Here we suppose that variables of HA coincides with variables of the untyped syntax of mTTs.
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equivalent to ∃u T (f, x, u) in ÎD1, the proof irrelevance and lemma 3.1 we can show that CTλ
can be realized by
Λf.〈f,Λx.〈{p1}({r}(f, x), 〈{p2}({r}(f, x), 0〉〉〉.
In fact every function from N to N is interpreted in the model as a code for a total recursive
function and we can send this code to itself in order to realize Church Thesis. Proof irrelevance
allows to ignore the problem that different codes can give rise to extensionally equal functions,
which is crucial to prove validity of CT.
We can conclude this section by stating the following consistency results:
Theorem 3.2. mTT is consistent with CT.
Corollary 3.1. emTT is consistent with CT.
Proof. According to the interpretation of emTT in mTT in [10], the interpretation of CT
turns now to be equivalent to CT itself. Therefore a model showing consistency ofmTT with
CT can be extended to a model of emTT with CT.
4 Conclusions
As explained in the introduction, the semantics built here is the best Kleene realizability model we
can construct for the extensional level emTT of the Minimalist Foundation, since emTT validates
Extensionality Equality of Functions and it is constructively incompatible with the Axiom of Choice
on generic sets (see [10]), which is instead valid in Beeson’s model. In our semantics instances of
the axiom of choice are still valid only on numerical sets, which include the interpretation of basic
intensional types as the set of natural numbers.
On the contrary, for the intensional level mTT of the Minimalist Foundation we hope to build
a more intensional realizability semantics a` la Kleene where we validate not only CT but also the
Axiom of Choice AC on generic types. Recalling from [10] that our mTT can be naturally in-
terpreted in Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with one universe, such an intensional Kleene realizability
for mTT could be obtained by modelling intensional Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with one universe
(with explicit substitutions in place of the usual substitution term equality rules) together with CT.
However, as far as we know, the consistency of intensional Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with CT is still
an open problem.
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5 Appendix: The typed calculus mTT
We present here the inference rules to build types in mTT. The inference rules involve judgements
written in the style of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory [17, 18] that may be of the form:
A type [Γ] A = B type [Γ] a ∈ A [Γ] a = b ∈ A [Γ]
where types include collections, sets, propositions and small propositions, namely
type ∈ {col, set, prop, props }
For easiness, the piece of context common to all judgements involved in a rule is omitted and
typed variables appearing in a context are meant to be added to the implicit context as the last one.
Note that to write the elimination constructors of our types we adopt the higher-order syntax in
[18] 11.
We also have a form of judgement to build contexts:
Γ cont
whose rules are the following
∅ cont F-c
A type [Γ]
Γ, x ∈ A cont
(x ∈ A 6∈ Γ)
Then, the first rule to build elements of type is the assumption of variables:
var)
Γ, x ∈ A,∆ cont
x ∈ A [Γ, x ∈ A,∆]
Among types there are the following embeddings: sets are collections and propositions are collections
set-into-col)
A set
A col
prop-into-col)
A prop
A col
Moreover, collections are closed under strong indexed sums:
Strong Indexed Sum
F-Σ)
C(x) col [x ∈ B]
Σx∈BC(x) col
I-Σ)
b ∈ B c ∈ C(b) C(x) col [x ∈ B]
〈b, c〉 ∈ Σx∈BC(x)
E-Σ)
M(z) col [z ∈ Σx∈BC(x)]
d ∈ Σx∈BC(x) m(x, y) ∈M(〈x, y〉) [x ∈ B, y ∈ C(x)]
ElΣ(d,m) ∈M(d)
C-Σ)
M(z) col [z ∈ Σx∈BC(x)]
b ∈ B c ∈ C(b) m(x, y) ∈M(〈x, y〉) [x ∈ B, y ∈ C(x)]
ElΣ( 〈b, c〉,m ) = m(b, c) ∈M(〈b, c〉)
11For example, note that the elimination constructor of disjunction El∨(w, aB , aC) binds the open terms aB(x) ∈
A [x ∈ B] and aC(y) ∈ A [y ∈ C]. Indeed, given that they are needed in the disjunction conversion rules, it follows
that these open terms must be encoded into the elimination constructor. To encode them we use the higher-order
syntax as in [18] (see also [6]). According to this syntax the open term aB(x) ∈ A [x ∈ B] yields to (x ∈ B) aB(x)
of higher type (x ∈ B)A. Then, by η-conversion among higher types, it follows that (x ∈ B) aB(x) is equal to aB .
Hence, we often simply write the short expression aB to recall the open term where it comes from.
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Sets are generated as follows:
Empty set
F-Em) N0 set E-Em)
a ∈ N0 A(x) col [x ∈ N0]
empo(a) ∈ A(a)
Singleton
S) N1 set I-S) ⋆ ∈ N1 E-S)
t ∈ N1 M(z) col [z ∈ N1] c ∈M(⋆)
ElN1 (t, c) ∈M(t)
C-S)
M(z) col [z ∈ N1] c ∈M(⋆)
ElN1(⋆, c) = c ∈M(⋆)
Strong Indexed Sum set
F-Σs)
C(x) set [x ∈ B] B set
Σx∈BC(x) set
List set
F-list)
C set
List(C) set
I1-list)
List(C) set
ǫ ∈ List(C)
I2-list)
s ∈ List(C) c ∈ C
cons(s, c) ∈ List(C)
E-list)
L(z) col [z ∈ List(C)] s ∈ List(C) a ∈ L(ǫ)
l(x, y, z) ∈ L(cons(x, y)) [x ∈ List(C), y ∈ C, z ∈ L(x)]
ElList(s, a, l) ∈ L(s)
C1-list)
L(z) col [z ∈ List(C)] a ∈ L(ǫ)
l(x, y, z) ∈ L(cons(x, y)) [x ∈ List(C), y ∈ C, z ∈ L(x)]
ElList(ǫ, a, l) = a ∈ L(ǫ)
C2-list)
L(z) col [z ∈ List(C)] s ∈ List(C) c ∈ C a ∈ L(ǫ)
l(x, y, z) ∈ L(cons(x, y)) [x ∈ List(C), y ∈ C, z ∈ L(x)]
ElList(cons(s, c), a, l) = l(s, c,ElList(s, a, l)) ∈ L(cons(s, c))
Disjoint Sum set
F-+)
B set C set
B + C set
I1-+)
b ∈ B B set C set
inl(b) ∈ B + C
I2-+)
c ∈ C B set C set
inr(c) ∈ B +C
E-+)
A(z) col [z ∈ B + C]
w ∈ B + C aB(x) ∈ A(inl(x)) [x ∈ B] aC(y) ∈ A(inr(y)) [y ∈ C]
El+(w, aB, aC) ∈ A(w)
C1-+)
A(z) col [z ∈ B + C]
b ∈ B aB(x) ∈ A(inl(x)) [x ∈ B] aC(y) ∈ A(inr(y)) [y ∈ C]
El+(inl(b), aB , aC) = aB(b) ∈ A(inl(c))
C2-+)
A(z) col [z ∈ B + C]
c ∈ C aB(x) ∈ A(inl(x)) [x ∈ B] aC(y) ∈ A(inr(y)) [y ∈ C]
El+(inr(c), aB , aC) = aC(c) ∈ A(inr(c))
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Dependent Product set
F-Π)
C(x) set [x ∈ B] B set
Πx∈BC(x) set
I-Π)
c(x) ∈ C(x) [x ∈ B] C(x) set [x ∈ B] B set
λx
B
.c(x) ∈ Πx∈BC(x)
E-Π)
b ∈ B f ∈ Πx∈BC(x)
Ap(f, b) ∈ C(b)
βC-Π)
b ∈ B c(x) ∈ C(x) [x ∈ B] C(x) set [x ∈ B] B set
Ap(λxB.c(x), b) = c(b) ∈ C(b)
Propositions are generated as follows:
Falsum
F-Fs) ⊥ prop E-Fs)
a ∈ ⊥ φ prop
ro(a) ∈ φ
Disjunction
F-∨)
ψ prop α prop
ψ ∨ α prop
I1-∨)
b ∈ ψ ψ prop α prop
inl∨(b) ∈ ψ ∨ α
I2-∨)
c ∈ α ψ prop α prop
inr∨(c) ∈ ψ ∨ α
E-∨)
φ prop
w ∈ ψ ∨ α aψ(x) ∈ φ [x ∈ ψ] aα(y) ∈ φ [y ∈ α]
El∨(w, aψ, aα) ∈ φ
C1-∨)
φ prop ψ prop α prop
b ∈ ψ aψ(x) ∈ φ [x ∈ ψ] aα(y) ∈ φ [y ∈ α]
El∨(inl∨(b), aψ, aα) = aψ(b) ∈ φ
C2-∨)
φ prop ψ prop α prop
c ∈ α aψ(x) ∈ φ [x ∈ ψ] aα(y) ∈ φ [y ∈ α]
El∨(inr∨(c), aψ, aα) = aα(c) ∈ φ
y
Conjunction
F-∧)
ψ prop α prop
ψ ∧ α prop
I-∧)
b ∈ ψ c ∈ α ψ prop α prop
〈b,∧ c〉 ∈ ψ ∧ α
E1-∧)
d ∈ ψ ∧ α
π
ψ
1 (d) ∈ ψ
E2-∧)
d ∈ ψ ∧ α
π
α
2 (d) ∈ α
β1 C-∧)
b ∈ ψ c ∈ α ψ prop α prop
π
ψ
1 (〈b,∧ c〉) = b ∈ ψ
β2 C-∧)
b ∈ ψ c ∈ α ψ prop α prop
π
α
2 (〈b,∧ c〉) = c ∈ α
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Implication
F-→)
ψ prop α prop
ψ → α prop
I-→)
c(x) ∈ α [x ∈ ψ] ψ prop α prop
λ→x
ψ
.c(x) ∈ ψ → α
E-→)
b ∈ ψ f ∈ ψ → α
Ap→(f, b) ∈ α
βC-→)
b ∈ ψ c(x) ∈ α [x ∈ ψ] ψ prop α prop
Ap→(λ→x
ψ
.c(x), b) = c(b) ∈ α
Existential quantification
F-∃)
α(x) prop [x ∈ ψ]
∃x∈Bα(x) prop
I-∃)
b ∈ B c ∈ α(b) α(x) prop [x ∈ B]
〈b,∃ c〉 ∈ ∃x∈Bα(x)
E-∃)
φ prop
d ∈ ∃x∈Bα(x) m(x, y) ∈ φ [x ∈ B, y ∈ α(x)]
El∃(d,m) ∈ φ
C-∃)
φ prop α(x) prop [x ∈ B]
b ∈ B c ∈ α(b) m(x, y) ∈ φ [x ∈ B, y ∈ α(x)]
El∃(〈b,∃ c〉, m) = m(b, c) ∈M
Universal quantification
F-∀)
α(x) prop [x ∈ B]
∀x∈Bα(x) prop
I-∀)
c(x) ∈ α(x) [x ∈ B] α(x) prop [x ∈ B]
λ∀xB.c(x) ∈ ∀x∈Bα(x)
E-∀)
b ∈ B f ∈ ∀x∈Bα(x)
Ap∀(f, b) ∈ α(b)
βC-∀)
b ∈ B c(x) ∈ α(x) [x ∈ B] α(x) prop [x ∈ B]
Ap∀(λ∀x
B
.c(x), b) = c(b) ∈ α(b)
Propositional Equality
F-Id)
A col a ∈ A b ∈ A
Id(A,a, b) prop
I-Id)
a ∈ A
idA(a) ∈ Id(A, a, a)
E-Id)
α(x, y) prop [x : A, y ∈ A]
a ∈ A b ∈ A p ∈ Id(A, a, b) c(x) ∈ α(x, x) [x ∈ A]
El Id(p, (x)c(x)) ∈ α(a, b)
C-Id)
α(x, y) prop [x : A, y ∈ A]
a ∈ A c(x) ∈ α(x, x) [x ∈ A]
El Id(idA(a), (x)c(x)) = c(a) ∈ α(a, a)
Then, we also have the collection of small propositions:
Collection of small propositions
F-Pr) props col
The collection of small propositions containes codes of small propositions
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T-Pr)
p ∈ props
T (p) props
which are generated as follows:
Pr1) ⊥̂ ∈ props Pr2)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
p∨̂q ∈ props
Pr3)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
p→̂q ∈ props
Pr4)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
p∧̂q ∈ props
Pr5)
p(x) props [x ∈ B] B set
∃̂x∈Bp(x) ∈ props
Pr6)
p(x) ∈ props [x ∈ B] B set
∀̂x∈Bp(x) ∈ props
Pr7)
A set a ∈ A b ∈ A
Îd(A,a, b) ∈ props
with the following definitional equalities:
eq-Pr1) T (⊥̂) = ⊥ eq-Pr2)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
T (p∨̂q) = T (p)∨ T (q)
eq-Pr3)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
T (p→̂q) = T (p)→ T (q)
eq-Pr4)
p ∈ props q ∈ props
T (p∧̂q) = T (p) ∧ T (q)
eq-Pr5)
p(x) props [x ∈ B] B set
T (∃̂x∈Bp(x)) = ∃x∈B T (p(x))
eq-Pr6)
p(x) ∈ props [x ∈ B] B set
T (∀̂x∈Bp(x)) = ∀x∈BT (p(x))
eq-Pr7)
A set a ∈ A b ∈ A
T ( Îd(A, a, b) ) = Id(A,a, b)
Then, we also have function collections from a set toward the collection of small propositions:
Function collection to props
F-Fun)
B set
B → props col
I-Fun)
c(x) ∈ props [x ∈ B] B set
λx
B
.c(x) ∈ B → props
E-Fun)
b ∈ B f ∈ B → props
Ap(f, b) ∈ props
βC-Fun)
b ∈ B c(x) ∈ props [x ∈ B] B set
Ap(λxB.c(x), b) = c(b) ∈ props
And we add rules saying that a small proposition is a proposition and that a small proposition is a set:
props-into-prop)
φ props
φ prop
props-into-set)
φ props
φ set
Equality rules include those saying that type equality is an equivalence relation and substitution of
equal terms in a type:
ref)
A type
A = A type
sym)
A = B type
B = A type
tra)
A = B type B = C type
A = C type
56
subT)
C(x1, . . . , xn) type [ x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1) ]
a1 = b1 ∈ A1 . . . an = bn ∈ An(a1, . . . , an−1)
C(a1, . . . , an) = C(b1, . . . , bn) type
where type ∈ {col, set, prop, props } with the same choice both in the premise and in the conclusion.
For terms into sets we add the following equality rules:
ref)
a ∈ A
a = a ∈ A
sym)
a = b ∈ A
b = a ∈ A
tra)
a = b ∈ A b = c ∈ A
a = c ∈ A
sub)
c(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C(x1, . . . , xn) [ x1 ∈ A1, . . . , xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1) ]
a1 = b1 ∈ A1 . . . an = bn ∈ An(a1, . . . , an−1)
c(a1, . . . , an) = c(b1, . . . , bn) ∈ C(a1, . . . , an)
conv)
a ∈ A A = B type
a ∈ B
conv-eq)
a = b ∈ A A = B type
a = b ∈ B
Now the equality rules about collections are the following:
Strong Indexed Sum-eq
eq-Σ)
C(x) = D(x) col [x ∈ B] B = E col
Σx∈BC(x) = Σx∈ED(x) col
Dependent Product-eq
eq-Π
C(x) = D(x) col [x ∈ B] B = E col
Πx∈BC(x) = Πx∈ED(x) col
Then, the equality about sets are the following:
Lists-eq
eq-list)
C = D set
List(C) = List(D) set
Strong Indexed Sum-eq
eq-Σ)
C(x) = D(x) set [x ∈ B] B = E set
Σx∈BC(x) = Σx∈ED(x) set
Disjoint Sum-eq
eq-+)
B = E set C = D set
B + C = E +D set
Dependent Product-eq
eq-Π
C(x) = D(x) set [x ∈ B] B = E set
Πx∈BC(x) = Πx∈ED(x) set
Then, mTT includes the following equalities rules about propositions:
Disjunction-eq
eq-∨)
ψ = α prop φ = β prop
ψ ∨ φ = α ∨ β prop
Implication-eq
eq-→
ψ = α prop φ = β prop
ψ → φ = α→ β prop
57
Conjunction-eq
eq-∧)
ψ = α prop φ = β prop
ψ ∧ φ = α ∧ β prop
Propositional equality-eq
eq-Id)
A = E col a = e ∈ A b = c ∈ A
Id(A,a, b) = Id(E, e, c) prop
Existential quantification-eq
eq-∃)
α(x) = β(x) prop [x ∈ B] B = E prop
∃x∈Bα(x) = ∃x∈Eβ(x) prop
Universal quantification-eq
eq-∀
α(x) = β(x) prop [x ∈ B] B = E prop
∀x∈Bα(x) = ∀x∈Eβ(x) prop
The equality of propositions is that of collections, that of small propositions coincides with that of
props and is that of propositions and that of sets:
prop-into-col eq
φ = ψ prop
φ = ψ col
props eq1
φ = ψ props
φ = ψ ∈ props
props eq2
φ = ψ ∈ props
φ = ψ props
props-into-prop eq
φ = ψ props
φ = ψ prop
props-into-set eq
φ = ψ props
φ = ψ set
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